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In today's economically vibrant and high-cost cities like New York, San Fran-
cisco, and Washington, D.C., housing growth and housing affordability are a
function of two variables: zoning and politics. This Article focuses on both in an
edge case-New York City's three fastest-growing ethnic and immigrant enclaves,
where larger households, lower incomes, and greater place-dependence raise the
stakes of the zoning game.
First are Hasidic Jewish communities, who employ a "Voice" strategy. By vir-
tue of numbers, spatial dominance within their enclaves, and bloc voting patterns,
the Hasidic Jews of Brooklyn have successfully advocated for rezonings and special
rules that have enabled them to densify and expand their enclaves over time.
Second are Chinese communities, who employ an "Exit" strategy. When
Manhattan Chinatown became too crowded and expensive, satellite Chinatowns
emerged in lower-density and lower-cost, outer-borough neighborhoods with
shrinking white populations and good transit connections to Chinatown.
Third are Bangladeshi, Indo-Caribbean, and other ethnically South Asian
communities, who employ an "Underground" strategy. Lacking political clout or
anywhere else to go in an increasingly housing-constrained city, these most recent
arrivals rode the subprime mortgage market to lower density outer-borough
neighborhoods. There, they resorted to unauthorized conversions and accessory
dwellings that in many neighborhoods amount to nothing less than guerrilla re-
zonings-and that resulted in a spate of "defensive downzonings" as incumbent
residents fought back.
Drawing from these three case studies, this Article identifies the formal and
informal strategies for effecting land use change in high-density urban areas, and
illustrates when these strategies are employed and why they meet with varying de-
grees of success. In doing so, this Article provides guidance for practitioners facing
the daunting challenge of expanding access to housing in high-cost, supply-
constrained cities.
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INTRODUCTION
In today's economically vibrant and high-cost cities like New York, San
Francisco, and Washington, D.C., housing growth happens (or not) as a func-
tion of two variables: zoning and politics. This Article focuses on both in an
edge case-New York City's fastest-growing ethnic and immigrant enclaves,
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where larger households, lower incomes, and greater place-dependence raise the
stakes of the zoning game.'
In one sense, fast-growing enclaves present the basic story in its strongest
form: No one in these development-constrained cities needs cheap and abun-
dant housing more than burgeoning enclavist populations. In another sense,
these enclaves are an exception: These groups frequently represent islands of
pro-development sentiment in cities where neighborhood opposition has made
development increasingly tough.
This Article examines housing and land use in the enclaves of three very
different immigrant and ethnic groups in New York, and the formal and infor-
mal strategies they use to make room for themselves in a housing-constrained
city. To an unexpected degree, it reveals the terms of the zoning game' in the
most consequential precincts of today's development-constrained cities-these
places may not be the richest, but their populations are growing the fastest. The
groups herein range from the undisputed champions of the zoning game to
those that, more than any other, find themselves on the losing end.
First are the Hasidic Jewish communities in South Williamsburg and Bor-
ough Park in Brooklyn, who employ what I call a "Voice" strategy.3 By virtue of
numbers, spatial dominance within their enclaves, and bloc voting patterns, the
Hasidic Jews of Brooklyn have successfully advocated for rezonings and special
rules that have enabled them to densify and expand their enclaves over time.4
Second are the Chinese communities in Chinatown in Manhattan, Sunset
Park in Brooklyn, and Flushing in Queens, who employ what I call an "Exit"
strategy. When Manhattan Chinatown became too crowded and expensive, sat-
ellite Chinatowns emerged in lower-density and lower-cost, outer-borough
neighborhoods with shrinking white populations and good transit connections
to Chinatown.
Third are Bangladeshi, Indo-Caribbean, and other ethnically South Asian
communities in neighborhoods like Richmond Hill, South Ozone Park, Jamaica
Hills, and Jackson Heights in Queens, who employ what I call an "Under-
1. See generally Edward L. Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko & Raven E. Saks, Why Have
Housing Prices Gone Up?, 95 AM. EcON. REv. 329 (2005); Roderick M. Hills, Jr. &
David N. Schleicher, Balancing the "Zoning Budget," 62 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 81
(2011); John Mangin, The New Exclusionary Zoning, 25 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 91
(2014); David N. Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670 (2013).
2. "Zoning Game" is a reference to Richard Babock's classic book. See RICHARD F.
BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME: MUNICIPAL PRACTICES AND POLICES (1966).
3. The terms "Voice" and "Exit" are borrowed very loosely from ALBERT 0.
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
4. In this Article, "rezonings" refer generally to changes in the zoning regulation that
determine what can be built on a particular development site or development sites
over a particular area. "Upzonings" refer to rezonings that increase the develop-
ment capacity of an area, and "downzonings" refer to rezonings that decrease the
development capacity of an area.
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ground" strategy. Lacking political clout or anywhere else to go in an increas-
ingly housing-constrained city, these most recent arrivals rode the subprime
mortgage market to lower-density outer-borough neighborhoods. There, they
resorted to unauthorized conversions and accessory dwellings that in many
neighborhoods amount to nothing less than guerrilla rezonings-and that re-
sulted in a spate of "defensive downzonings" as incumbent residents fought
back.'
This Article also presents a theoretical framework of basic formal and in-
formal strategies for effecting land use change, and illuminates when these
strategies are employed and why they meet with varying degrees of success. The
factors fall into two general categories.
First is the political and economic strength of the group. Does the group
exert influence at the ballot box? What is their citizenship status? Are they own-
ers or renters? Do they own multifamily buildings and develop property? Do
they have strong and well-organized community-based organizations? What
economic resources can the group marshal, individually and collectively?
Second is the land use and market context of the neighborhood. Where is
the neighborhood located in the context of the broader city? What land use
procedures and other regulations govern changes to land use in the area? What
is the underlying zoning? What is the housing stock? What is the trajectory of
housing prices?
This Article's focus is not on these enclaves per se, as interesting as those
stories are, but rather on what their stories illuminate about the ways in which
local land use decisions happen and how people make a place for themselves in
increasingly expensive and housing-constrained cities across the country.
As a growing body of economic and legal literature demonstrates, these are
important questions. Resurgent cities like New York, San Francisco, Boston,
Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C. are America's most economically dynamic,
where workers can become more productive, earn more, and gain greater access
to economic opportunity. Economists such as Edward Glaeser and Joseph
Gyourko, among others, have shown how restrictive land use regulations drive
up housing costs as people drawn to these urban economic engines bid up the
price of limited housing supply.' Throughout America's history, a main driver
of upward mobility has been migration from low-wage areas to high-wage are-
as. Recent research by economists Peter Ganong and Daniel Shoag shows that
this process has all but stopped; for the first time in American history, workers
are moving toward low housing costs rather than high wages.7
5. This Article does not look closely at any black and Latino immigrant groups, in
part because these groups face a unique set of complicating challenges relating to
settlement patterns and neighborhood choice. John R. Logan, Wenquan Zhang &
Richard D. Alba, Immigrant Enclaves and Ethnic Communities in New York and
Los Angeles, 67 AM. Soc. REv. 299, 301 (2002).
6. Glaeser, Gyourko & Saks, supra note 1.
7. Peter Ganong & Daniel Shoag, Why Has Regional Convergence in the U.S. De-
clined? 3 (Harv. Kennedy Sch., Working Paper No. RWP12-028, 2012),
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Economists Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, and others have limned the
micro" effects of these trends in their recent work on the geography of oppor-
tunity: They show that where an individual resides shapes his or her life pro-
spects to a greater degree than previously understood.' Economists Enrico
Moretti and Chang-Tai Hsieh, on the other hand, have outlined the "macro"
effects: As workers migrate to less productive areas, the exclusionary effects of
restricted housing supply have cost the United States almost fifty percent of ag-
gregate growth since the 1960s.9
As an older literature on exclusionary zoning attests, these patterns imprint
themselves in microcosm at a local level, where a forward feedback loop of re-
strictive land use regulations and political opposition to development function-
ally excludes low-income people from wealthy suburbs and higher opportunity
neighborhoods within cities. Economist William Fischel pioneered the litera-
ture on the causes and effect of zoning regulations in a suburban context, with
attention to the structural political factors-that is, the dominance of the
"Homevoter"-that led to restrictive land use regimes.o Legal scholars such as
David Schleicher and Rick Hills have updated this literature for an era of resur-
gent cities, with special attention to the procedural determinants of chronic un-
dersupply of housing and the policy innovations that might ameliorate them."
Addressing this problem will require close attention to the ground-level in-
stitutions and politics that shape how a city grows and changes over time. This
Article attempts to do just that through the lens of fast-growing immigrant and
ethnic enclaves by providing a bottom-up perspective of sub-local, pro-housing
land use change.'
Part I outlines why enclavist groups are particularly important to contem-
porary land use debates and examines overcrowding, a problem that spans the
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2081216 [http://perma.cc/
BB35-SWVZ].
8. Raj Chetty et al., Where is the Land of Opportunity?: The Geography of Intergenera-
tional Mobility in the United States, 129 Q.J. ECON. 1553, 1619-20 (2014).
9. Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Housing Constraints and Spatial Misallocation
2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper 21154, 2015), http://www.nber.org/
papers/w21154 [http://perma.cc/V8AN-8DRY].
10. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAws 66 (1985); see also
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS (2001).
11. See, e.g., Hills & Schleicher, supra note 1; Schleicher, supra note 1; Roderick M.
Hills, Jr. & David N. Schleicher, City Replanning (Geo. Mason L. & Econ.
Res. Paper Series No. 14-32, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=2477125 [http://perma.cc/4Y7M-BS7R].
12. In some instances, the groups examined in this Article make group-regarding land
use decisions, for reasons as vague as feelings of ethnic solidarity or as specific as
the programs of particular coordinating institutions. This is interesting in itself, as
it contrasts with the (generally accurate) atomistic, property-value-regarding take
on land use politics found elsewhere in the scholarship.
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communities discussed in this Article and spurs the strategies they employ to
make room for themselves. Part II identifies and describes the set of economic,
political, legal, and social factors that shape and constrain these strategies, and
forwards a schema that structures the discussion of the enclaves that follows.
Part III discusses the Hasidic communities in Williamsburg and Borough Park,
the "Voice" strategy, and the ongoing land use battles between the Hasidim and
neighboring communities. Part IV focuses on the Chinese communities in Chi-
natown, Sunset Park, and Flushing, the "Exit" strategy, and ongoing satellite
enclave formation in what will soon be New York City's largest immigrant
community. Part V examines ethnically South Asian communities in Queens,
with a particular focus on Bangladeshis, New York City's fastest-growing immi-
grant group. This Part also outlines the "Underground" strategy and the back-
lash, in the form of defensive downzonings, to the densification of quasi-
suburban neighborhoods in Queens. Part VI concludes with a discussion of
what these enclaves illustrate about how land use policy and practice change in
the broader city and in other housing-constrained cities like it across the coun-
try.
I. IMMIGRATION AND OVERCROWDING IN NEW YORK CITY
Immigrant and enclavist populations in New York City are more place-
dependent and grow more quickly than native-born populations. This is espe-
cially true for the three groups discussed in this Article. 3 Both of these facts al-
ter the terms of the zoning game for them. The production of adequate
amounts of housing in particular places is especially important to immigrant
groups.
Native-born English speakers can more easily move toward lower housing
costs, more space, or better job opportunities in other parts of the city or coun-
try. Immigrants, on the other hand, often lack language and cultural skills and
rely on co-ethnics in immigrant enclaves to help them navigate the new country
and find housing, jobs, and services.1 4 For some immigrants, securing a liveli-
13. Many in the Hasidic Jewish population, especially the Satmar Hasidim in Wil-
liamsburg, are not immigrants, though they share several of the characteristics of
many immigrant groups-linguistic isolation, high fertility rates, residence in en-
claves, for example-that make them an appropriate subject for this Article.
14. While not addressing the enclave effect or the internal migration of immigrants,
Professors Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak find that larger households, lower in-
come, and foreign birth correlate with somewhat lower rates of internal migra-
tion. Raven Molloy, Christopher L. Smith & Abigail Wozniak, Internal Migration
in the United States 34 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Res. Working Paper No. 17307, 2011),
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl7307.pdf [http://perma.cc/9C7N-CRV6]. There is
also a robust debate in sociology and economics about whether immigrant en-
claves help or hurt new immigrants over the long term. For scholarship that says
returns to human capital in ethnic and immigrant enclaves is typically higher than
in the mainstream primary and secondary labor market, see, for example,
ALEJANDRO PORTES & ROBERT L. BACH, LATIN JOURNEY CUBAN AND MEXICAN
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hood will depend on living in or near an enclave. Others simply prefer the fa-
miliarity of a neighborhood of their co-ethnics." Whether by constraint or pref-
erence, immigrants face limits to exit that native-born populations do not.
Higher birth rates and ongoing immigration lead to faster rates of growth
for many immigrant communities. Relative to the native-born New Yorkers,
immigrants are more concentrated in the child-bearing ages and have higher
married-couple ratios, higher fertility rates, and larger households-3.1 people
per household on average as compared to 2.4 for native-born."6 Immigrants in
New York City make up thirty-eight percent of the population but account for a
small majority of births." Immigrant communities also grow due to ongoing
immigration. Bangladeshis, for instance, have high fertility and large house-
holds-4.3 people per household on average"
The watershed event in the recent history of New York immigration is the
passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965.' The Act greatly in-
creased the total number of immigrants and opened the United States for the
first time to large-scale immigration from non-European countries.
In the absence of the post-1965 surge, New York City might have experi-
enced Rust-Belt-style population implosion in the 1970s and beyond.2 o New
IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1985). For the opposing view, that returns for
immigrants to human capital are below those in mainstream labor markets, and
that participation in enclave labor markets harms immigrants' long term earning
potential, see, for example, George J. Borjas, Ethnicity, Neighborhoods, and Human
Capital Externalities (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Res. Working Paper No. 4912, 1994),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w4912 [http://perma.cc8S7U-JHW6].
15. Logan, Zhang, and Alba note the distinction between an immigrant enclave and
ethnic community. The former is a way station on the way to assimilation for new
immigrants; the latter a destination for assimilated immigrants who prefer to live
in neighborhoods with co-ethnics. Logan, Zhang & Alba, supra note 5, at 300.
16. Eighty percent of immigrants are between the ages of 18 and 64, as opposed to
fifty-eight percent of native-born. Arun Peter Lobo & Joseph J. Salvo, The Newest
New Yorkers: Characteristics of the City's Foreign-Born Population, N.Y.C. DEP'T
CITY PLAN. 95, 99 (2013) [hereinafter Newest New Yorkers), http://wwwl.nyc.gov/
assets/planning/download/pdf/data-maps/nyc-population/nny2013/nny-2013.pdf
[http://perma.cc/KHT4-YCDG].
17. NYC's Foreign Born, 2000-2015, N.Y.C. DEP'T CITY PLAN. (March 2017),
http://wwwl.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/about/dcp-priorities/data
-expertise/nyc-foreign-born-info-brief.pdf [http://perma.cc/DGT8-RMU4].
18. Newest New Yorkers, supra note 16, at 99.
19. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codi-
fled as amended at 8 U.S.C. §1001 to §1178 (2012)).
20. To be fair, the nature of New York City's economy would have led to a post- 1970s
population revival not availing in the former manufacturing centers of the Mid-
west. New York City's economy is built around sectors like finance, insurance,
and real estate that would boom in the 1980s and beyond, enabling the region to
avoid the more pronounced economic troubles and population decreases in other
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York City lost over 1.1 million people to out-migration during the famously
bleak 1970s, with a natural increase of only about 360,000.' These statistics
strongly suggest that, absent immigration, the abandonment and blight associ-
ated with the South Bronx of the era would have spread to vast swaths of other
boroughs as well. Instead, the city registered more modest population losses
due to an influx of 786,000 immigrants.' In the decades since, immigrants, by
their numbers alone, have led a city-wide urban resurgence, moving into and
revivifying neighborhoods like Sunset Park or Williamsburg that threatened a
downward spiral." Today, New York City has 3.2 million immigrants repre-
senting thirty-eight percent of the population, more than double the number
and proportion just 40 years ago.2 4 Both are all-time highs. The most immi-
grant-infused boroughs are Queens, with just over a million immigrants, and
Brooklyn, with just under a million.25
Immigrants continue to pour into New York, but the days when immi-
grants could take over territory abandoned by out-movers are largely over-it's
a different story now that New York is once again a highly desirable place to live
with an expanding economy and historically low crime rates. Domestic in-
migration has increased in the last decade, from about 80,000 people early in
the 2000s to over 100,000 per year toward the end of that decade, resulting in
stiffer competition and higher costs for housing.26 Add to that the fact that im-
migrants have much lower access to public housing and other forms of subsi-
dized housing-many are not eligible, have not been here long enough to work
through waiting lists, or simply do not know how to navigate the system."
parts of the country. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser & Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto, Did
the Death of Distance Hurt Detroit and Help New York?, in AGGLOMERATION
ECONOMICS 303 (Edward L. Glaeser ed., 2010).
21. Newest New Yorkers, supra note 16, at 179.
22. Id.
23. Increased immigration may have succeeded where Urban Renewal and a host of
other government programs failed, at least in New York's case. LOUIS WINNICK,
NEW PEOPLE IN OLD NEIGHBORHOODS: THE ROLE OF NEW IMMIGRANTS IN
REJUVENATING NEW YORK'S COMMUNITIES 10-11 (1990).
24. Newest New Yorkers, supra note 16, at 2. Updated by Population Division, New
York City Department of City Planning through September 29, 2017, using U.S.
Census Bureau, 2015 American Community Survey, Public Use Microdata File.
25. Id. at 3. Updated by Population Division, New York City Department of City
Planning through September 29, 2017,.using U.S. Census Bureau, 2015 American
Community Survey, Public Use Microdata File.
26. Id. at 181. Updated by Population Division, New York City Department of City
Planning through September 29, 2017, using U.S. Census Bureau, 2015 American
Community Survey, Public Use Microdata Sample.
27. See, e.g., MAGGIE MCCARTY & ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31753,
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Many immigrant groups-especially those discussed in this Article-face a se-
vere housing squeeze.
A. Immigrants and Overcrowding
Perhaps the most basic of the informal housing strategies available in ex-
pensive cities is overcrowding-that is, using a dwelling unit or residential
building to house more people than it is intended to house. Immigrant groups
in New York City face much higher rates of overcrowding than native-born
New Yorkers. Citywide, 20.5% of immigrant households are "crowded"-
defined as more than one person per room-and 7.6% are "severely crowd-
ed"--defined as more than 1.5 persons per room. The rates for non-immigrant
households are 6.6% and 2.4%, respectively. Immigrants experience triple the
rate of crowding and severe crowding.' Crowding is getting worse as housing
supply lags behind population increase, as the city becomes more expensive,
and as the proportion of immigrants, with their large households, rises. 9
Crowding and severe crowding dipped to lows of 4.3% and 1.5% in 1978 and
have steadily increased since then, with a more pronounced uptick after the fi-
nancial crisis, when housing production slowed and people became poorer.3o
About two-thirds, or 148,000, of the city's 241,000 crowded households are
immigrant households.3' A substantial proportion of the crowded non-
immigrant households is most likely large, native-born Hasidic families in Wil-
liamsburg and Borough Park. (The city does not publish statistics on crowded
Jewish households.) In Queens, the numbers were even starker-86.4%, or ap-
proximately 54,000, of Queens's 63,000 crowded renter households were immi-
grants.32 The worst overcrowding occurs in the Bangladeshi and ethnically
South Asian populations located predominantly in Queens. Almost 45% of
Bangladeshi households are crowded.33
Crowding is largely a function of household size. About one-quarter of
four-person households are crowded; 55% of five-person households are
crowded; 80% of six-person households are crowded; and a whopping 91% of
households with seven or more people are crowded.34 It can be difficult for large
28. Moon Wha Lee, Housing: New York City, N.Y.C. DEP'T Hous. PRES. & DEv. 143
(2011), http://wwwl.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdf/HVS-report-2011 .pdf
[http://perma.cc/3B5L-65S5].
29. Id. at 496.
30. Id. at 502.
31. Id. at 491.
32. Id. at 55.
33. Newest New Yorkers, supra note 16, at 99.
34. Lee, supra note 28, at 55.
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households to find appropriate accommodation-of the city's 2.17 million
rental apartments, only 16% are three-bedroom or larger.35
Immigrants have larger families and are more likely to have crowded
households. Immigrants are also more likely to host "hidden households"-that
is, households that are doubled- or tripled-up with sub-families in a single
apartment. About 62% of the 176,000 households with sub-families are headed
by immigrants.36 Indeed, a map of crowded households in the 2011 Housing
and Vacancy Survey shows a heavy swath of hidden households through China-
town in Manhattan, Sunset Park, and Bensonhurst in Brooklyn, and immi-
grant-heavy parts of Queens. 37
"Crowdedness" cuts across almost all non-European immigrant groups and
afflicts the immigrant and ethnic enclaves discussed in this article especially
acutely. It serves as a major impetus for the varied strategies these groups em-
ploy to make more room for themselves. To "uncrowd" themselves, growing
populations in supply-constrained areas need to create more housing-either
formally ("Voice") or informally ("Underground")-or move to where more
housing exists ("Exit").
II. VOICE, ExIT, UNDERGROUND
The Parts that follow schematize the strategies that crowded Hasidic, Chi-
nese, and Bangladeshi enclaves use to make room for their expanding popula-
tions in New York City. These strategies range from formal to informal, from
centrally orchestrated to the product of innumerable independent decisions.
These divergent responses emerge from a background of opportunities and
constraints that affect these groups in very different ways.
This Part examines these opportunities and constraints in a systematic
way-as a set of factors that define the possibilities for these enclaves and for
other sub-local groups seeking to influence land use policy and practice in the
places they live. It's useful to put these factors under two broad headings: The
first pertains to the political, economic, and demographic characteristics of the
group itself; and the second pertains to the land use and market context of the
neighborhood and broader city. Another way to think of the split is between
factors internal to the group and factors external to the group.
This Part introduces a set of factors that, first, provide an analytical frame-
work for strategies employed by the three enclaves to be explored in Parts III,
IV, and V; and, second, have a broader bearing on bottom-up efforts by other
groups to change land use policy and practice in New York City and elsewhere.
35. Id. at 302.
36. Id. at 151.
37. Id. at 487.
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A. Political and Economic Characteristics
Implied in the Introduction is a spectrum of strategies, from formal and lic-
it to informal and illicit: "Voice" adapts the law to the needs of the group
through established political processes; "Exit" adapts the group within the de-
mands of the law; "Underground" simply conflicts with the law. A further im-
plication is that formal and licit strategies are generally preferable to informal
and illicit strategies of last resort that carry with them various risks and uncer-
tainties.
The ability of a group to pursue changes to land use policy through formal
channels depends on its ability to exert political and economic power. The first
set of factors represent a list of "ingredients" for political power in a land use
context.
1. Political Factors
Population. This is the most basic ingredient-larger numbers, all .else
equal, translate into greater power. Population is not the most direct proxy for
power at the ballot box. But many aspects of the formal land use process in New
York City and elsewhere, such as public meetings, do not hinge on the right to
vote so much as the ability to turn up.
Citizenship. In most cities, only citizens have the right to vote for elected
representatives or in various referenda that structure land use procedure or de-
termine land use outcomes. This limitation can put immigrant groups, particu-
larly recently arrived immigrant groups, at a significant disadvantage in the
zoning game."
Voter Participation. In big cities, voter participation for local elections is
notoriously low, especially when local elections are held separately from federal
elections, as in New York City, and particularly in primary elections, which tend
to be decisive in cities that lack partisan competition." In New York City,
38. Note that there have been periodic attempts in New York City to extend the right
to vote in municipal elections to lawful immigrants. See, most recently, Introduc-
tory Bill 410, a proposed local law sponsored by over 30 Councilmembers in 2010.
The City Council held hearings on the bill but it expired without a vote at the end
of that Council session. See A Local Law to Amend the New York City Charter, in
Relation to Allowing Immigrants Lawfully Present in New York City to Vote in Mu-
nicipal Elections, N.Y.C. COUNCIL (2010), http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/
LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=803591&GUID=3652CB45-9436-4D4F-ADE3-
E17CE8A8AF28 [http://perma.cc/97MK-UTAW].
39. Most major US cities lack partisan competition. See David Schleicher, Why Is
There No Partisan Competition in City Council Elections? The Role of Election Law,
23 J.L. & POL'Y 419 (2007).
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groups that send even a few hundred voters to sub-local primaries can affect
electoral outcomes and expect responsive representatives. 40
Issue Alignment. There is no guarantee that members of ethnic and immi-
grant groups hold homogeneous views on housing and land use issues. Align-
ment can amplify the power of a group to act through formal and informal
channels; disagreement can dampen that power. This factor is a less significant
consideration for affinity groups premised on issue alignment, like preserva-
tionist organizations or, to a lesser extent, neighborhood associations, which
tend to lean anti-development. 41
Territorial Dominance. Land use politics is perhaps the most place-based
politics of all. Most big cities, New York among them, include a formal sub-
local component in land use procedure, such as neighborhood advisory boards
and a decisive role for the sub-locally elected Councilperson. 42 Groups that pre-
dominate within a particular geography have a greater ability to realize their
preferred land use outcomes, whether through formal or informal channels,
than groups interspersed with others that might disagree.
Community-Based Organizations. Effective Community-Based Organiza-
tions (CBOs) gather and focus political power in a way that cuts across the fac-
tors above. The communities they serve may be ethnic, religious, geographic, or
40. For instance, in the most recent Democratic Primary in Council District 1 in New
York City, voter turnout was approximately 17.7% (12,196 voters out of 68,972)
and the election was decided by approximately 200 votes (5,363 for Margaret
Chin and 5,141 for Christopher Marte). See Council District Summary Report As of
4/1/2017, N.Y.C. BD. ELECTIONS 1 (2017), http://vote.nyc.ny.us/downloads/pdf/
documents/boe/EnrollmentTotals/2017/CityCouncilEnrollmentTotals_4_4
2017.pdf [http://perma.cc/96MR-4WW7]; Statement and Return Report for Certi-
fication: Primary Election 09/12/2017 Democratic Member of the City Council 1st




41. For a classic work on the political dynamic effects of concentrated and homoge-
neous versus diffuse and heterogeneous interests, see generally MANCUR OLSON,
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS
(1965).
42. See N.Y.C. CHARTER §197-c (2018). The Uniform Land Use Review Procedure
(ULURP), as New York City's land use review procedure is known, includes for-
mal (if advisory) review of land use actions by affected Community Boards before
advisory review by the Borough President and votes by the City Planning Com-
mission and City Council. Though not formalized, the City Council typically de-
fers to the member of the affected district when determining how to vote on an
action. For more on how this informal system of aldermanic privilege tends to
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any combination of these.43 They can augment the power of groups that "score
high" on the factors above; for groups that "score low," they represent perhaps
a second-best way to influence political outcomes. Most of these organizations
have a general portfolio. Those with significant housing, development, and land
use capacity can be important players in land use debates.
2. Economic Factors
Wealth and Income. This factor is self-explanatory. High-income groups
will be less constrained by high and rising housing costs than low-income
groups-not only in terms of securing adequate housing through the licit mar-
ket, but also in their ability to influence the direction of land use policy through
established political channels.
Tenure. Ownership is synonymous with control, and groups with higher
rates of ownership can exert greater control over the built environment and
neighborhood change in the areas where they live, especially in one- and two-
family districts around the city.44 Owners tend to be more politically efficacious
than renters, all else equal, amplifying the ability of high-ownership groups to
affect the direction of land use policy. Groups with high ownership rates are
more insulated from the adverse effects of a high and rising market-indeed,
they benefit from it.4
Multifamily Ownership. Some ethnic and immigrant groups have a signifi-
cant multifamily-owner class that rents to other members of the group. Multi-
family owners enjoy an enhanced version of the benefits of ownership described
immediately above; renters may also benefit if owners act in group-regarding
ways. In New York City, multifamily owners can file applications for variances,
zoning changes, and other discretionary actions.46
Development Capacity. Some ethnic and immigrant groups have a signifi-
cant developer class that can directly drive changes in land use regulation and
can ensure that the economic benefits of new development redound primarily
to members of the group. In many cities, including New York, developer appli-
cations are a primary vehicle for small-scale changes to zoning that accumulate
in neighborhoods over time. Groups may also be more disposed to support-or
43. William H. Simon, The Community Economic Development Movement, 2002 Wis.
L. REv. 377, 379.
44. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 10.
45. William M. Rohe, Shannon Van Zandt & George McCarthy, The Social Benefits
and Costs of Homeownership: A Critical Assessment of the Research (Joint Ctr. for
Hous. Studies of Harv. Univ., Working Paper LIHO-01.12, 2001),
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/iho1-12.pdf [http://
perma.cc/54QN-B2K9].
46. See, e.g., Nick Tabor, How Has Chinatown Stayed Chinatown?, N.Y. MAG. (Sept.
24, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/09/how-has
-chinatown-stayed-chinatown.html [http://perma.cc/2DEQ-5GWR].
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at least not oppose-development and zoning changes when developers and
applicants for zoning changes are members of the group.47
B. Land Use and Market Context
Groups at all levels of political and economic efficacy can and do play an
active role in shaping their land use fate, though that fate is shaped in turn by
external factors-most significantly the land use, market, and built contexts in
which these groups operate. This Section enumerates these basic external fac-
tors that create and constrain opportunities for these groups.
Land Use Procedure. In a land use context, the form political action takes,
and often its chances for ultimate success, is deeply shaped by land use proce-
dure.4 Cities vary significantly in the degree to which land use decisionmaking
occurs at a citywide or sub-local level. Sub-local decisionmaking is associated
with lower levels of development overall, but also gives sub-local groups greater
opportunity to influence land use policy in the places they live-including, this
Article argues, in a pro-development direction. 49 Land use procedure also de-
termines how easy or difficult it is to change land use regulation in response to
existing needs. Different actions may involve one step or many, may be relative-
ly straightforward or require the participation of expensive experts. Complex or
technical processes, as in New York City, can present significant barriers to en-
try for all but the savviest developers.5 0
Zoning. In many high-cost cities, the ability to build more housing in the
absence of land use changes-perhaps the simplest strategy for groups seeking
more room-is constrained by zoning regulations that limit the bulk of new
buildings." The ethnic enclave strategies outlined in this Article in part repre-
sent responses to New York City's regulatory limits, even if it has unused zoned
capacity elsewhere.
Location. The location of a group within the larger city also matters to out-
comes. As will be seen in the discussion below, a desirable location close to a
central business district or natural amenities may bring with it pressures and
47. See, e.g., Stephen Jacob Smith, Weapons of Mass Construction: Satrnars' Secret to
Keeping Housing Prices Low, N.Y. OBSERVER (Mar. 26, 2013, 6:48 PM),
http://observer.com/201 3/03/weapons-of-mass-construction-satmars-secret-to
-keeping-housing-prices-low/ [http://perma.cc/U6RR-KG5H].
48. Schleicher, supra note 1.
49. In New York as in many other cities, most changes to land use regulation hinge
on the support of the sub-local Councilperson and include input from a sub-local
advisory board. N.Y.C. CHARTER §197-c (2018).
50. For an extensive discussion of how complexity serves as a development-
suppressing barrier to entry, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David N. Schleicher,
Planning an Affordable City, 101 IOWA L. REV. 91 (2015).
51. Glaeser, Gyourko & Saks, supra note 1, at 329-33.
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constraints not faced by groups in less contested locations." The status of adja-
cent neighborhoods shapes whether enclaves have room to expand. Proximity
to transit infrastructure influences where new enclaves might grow while main-
taining ties to the city center. An out-of-the-way location may provide more
freedom for informal strategies. 3
Housing Stock. The typology of existing housing stock is a significant factor
in whether the housing can be subdivided (either legally or illegally) to create
additional density, or whether a site can be redeveloped with a larger building.
Additional bedrooms can be carved out of apartments in multifamily build-
ings-a New York City tradition-but one- and two-family homes provide
greater flexibility to create whole new units." Where zoning permits, it's also
more feasible to knock down one- and two-family homes (as opposed to multi-
family buildings that include tenants with various legal protections) to create a
larger building."
Housing Cost Trajectory. High and rising regional, local, and sub-local
housing costs constrain everyone's housing options in high-cost cities. All else
equal, lower costs mean more options to expand in a given area, to move to an-
other location, or to choose between formal or informal strategies in order to
accommodate a growing population.5 '
Rent Regulations. Big cities vary in the stringency of their rent regulations.
In New York City, rent regulations offer protection to certain classes of tenants,
but also make denser redevelopment of covered buildings more difficult, con-
straining housing markets.Y Rent regulations also affect land use politics. Pro-
52. Veronica Guerrieri, David A. Hartley & Erik Hurst, Endogenous Gentrification and
Housing-Price Dynamics 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No.
10-08R, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1657176 [http://perma.cc/C8SE
-Q9TG].
53. See, e.g., Mayara Guimaraes, City Line Has Become a Bangladeshi Enclave, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (Sept. 15, 2013, 6:17 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/
brooklyn/city-line-bangladeshi-enclave-article-1.1456813 [http://perma.cc/W334
-XGAB].
54. See, e.g., Michelle Higgins, Making More Space in a One-Bedroom Apartment, N.Y.
TIMES (July 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/26/realestate/making
-more-space-in-a-one-bedroom-apartment.html [http://perma.cc/R7FP-6RF7].
55. Some groups also create housing distinctive in style and construction that serves
as a claim of sorts to certain territory and may help to anchor groups to certain
places over time and keep out non-members. See, e.g., Kirk Semple, Questions of
Size and Taste for Queens Houses, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2008), http://www.nytimes
.com/2008/07/05/nyregion/05forest.html [http://perma.cc/7WFM-CMQE].
56. Ganong & Shoag, supra note 7.
57. Because landlords cannot remove rent-regulated tenants at will, the City's envi-
ronmental review procedures generally assume that buildings with rent-regulated
units will not be redeveloped, even when they are significantly smaller than the
current zoning would allow. City Environmental Quality Review Technical Manu-
al, N.Y.C. MAYOR'S OFF. ENVTL. COORDINATION 5-7 to 5-9 (Mar. 2014),
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tected tenants, whose rents are fixed by the regulations, may be unconcerned
about the effect on prices of ongoing housing shortages, and activists may focus
political energy on more stringent rent regulation rather than addressing under-
lying land use or housing supply issues. In this way, rent regulations can influ-
ence both the views of group members and the strategies available for making
more room for their populations."
To varying degrees, and in their presence or absence, all of the above factors
are at play in the following discussion of ethnic enclaves. These factors describe
opportunities and constraints that affect Hasidic, Chinese, and Bangladeshi
groups differently and guide each toward a different strategy for making room
for their expanding populations.
The Parts below begin with a brief account of each enclave's formation, fol-
lowed by explicit reference to the factors described above and how they have
shaped and constrained each group's engagement with the zoning game
through previous decades up to the present day. Attention to these factors offers
a view from below of the daunting challenges supply-constrained cities face in
creating more housing and potentially promising ways to address these obsta-
cles.
III. HASIDIc ENCLAVES AND THE "VOICE" STRATEGY
The Hasidic enclaves in Williamsburg and Borough Park use what I call a
"Voice" strategy to make room for their expanding communities in their
Brooklyn enclaves. In a city where neighborhood associations and housing ad-
vocates lobby constantly for downzonings, special zoning districts, historic dis-
tricts, and other protections against new development, these groups are very
nearly alone in lobbying elected representatives and city officials for increased
development capacity, rezonings, and special rules in the zoning resolution that
have enabled them to densify and expand their enclaves over time.
A. The Satmar of Williamsburg
The Yiddish-speaking Satmar enclave in South Williamsburg has its origins
in the years immediately following World War II when the Grand Rebbe of the
Satmar, Rabbi Joel Teitelbaum, who miraculously survived the Holocaust,
moved to Brooklyn with a few Hasidic families from Satu Mare, their old village
in what is now Romania. 9 Many of the community's remnant followed the
http://wwwl.nyc.gov/assets/oec/technical-manual/2014-ceqr_technical-manual_
rev_04_27_2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/HG6G-BYX6].
58. See Schleicher, supra note 1, at 1730.
59. ISRAEL RUBIN, SATMAR: Two GENERATIONS OF AN URBAN ISLAND 47 (1997).
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Rabbi to Brooklyn in subsequent years. The sect attracted some new adherents,
but the enclave comprised just a few hundred people into the 1950s."o Since
then, the enclave population has expanded dramatically due to the extraordi-
nary fecundity of its residents. Fertility rates are among the highest in the city.
Between 2002 and 2011, the enclave's population grew by 41% through natural
increase.6
In 2011, the enclave had approximately 75,000 members in a 70-block area
and an average household size of 4 people.6 2 It is among the youngest commu-
nities in New York City. In 2000, fully half of the community was 18 or under,
and another 34% were under 40. Only 3% were over 65.63 Eighty-five percent of
adults are married.4 The Satmar enclave started as a community of immigrants,
but its youth and rate of growth mean that today the enclave has among the
lowest percentage of foreign-born members in the city." There is a smattering
of Hungarian and Romanian immigrants left from the post-WWII period, and
a couple hundred Israelis.66
The community is also very poor. Seventy-eight percent have family in-
comes below $50,000 per year and 55% have incomes below 150% of the pov-
erty line. Kiryas Joel, a satellite enclave founded upstate in the 1970s to relieve
some of the population pressure in Williamsburg, was, as of 2011, the youngest
and poorest municipality of more than 10,000 people in the country, with a
median age of 13 and a median family income of $18,000. Seventy percent of
families live below the poverty line.6 7 The Satmar also have smaller outposts in
6o. Id.
61. Pearl Beck et al., Jewish Community Study of New York 2011 Geographic Profile,
UJA-FEDERATION N.Y. 28 (2013), http://www.bjpa.org/content/upload/
bjpa/cc/JCSNY-2011-Geographic-Profile-Report-Rev-10-13.pdf [http://perma
.cc/GSF2-NN87].
62. Id. at 122. The 4.0 average household size is probably an underestimate because it
includes much smaller non-Hasidic Jewish households elsewhere in the commu-
nity district. Heilman estimates a household size more in line with the Satmar en-
clave in Kiryas Joel upstate, which has an average household size of 6.6. SAMUEL
HEILMAN, SLIDING TO THE RIGHT: THE CONTEST FOR THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN
JEWISH ORTHODOXY 224 (2006).
63. Id. at 223-25.
64. Id.
65. Maxwell Austensen et al., State of New York City's Housing and Neighborhoods in
2016, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR. HOUSING & URB. POL'Y 54 (2016), http://
furmancenter.org/files/sotc/SOC_2016_Ful.pdf [http://perma.cc/8BTN-PN7HJ.
66. The connection between the enclave and Israel are weaker than one might expect.
A constitutive belief of the Satmar sect is that a Jewish state should only be estab-
lished by the Messiah and so they hold Israel to be theologically illegitimate.
RUBIN, supra note 59, at 66.
67. Sam Roberts, A Village with the Numbers, Not the Image, of the Poorest Place, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/2 1/nyregion/kiryas-joel-
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Willow Brook and Bloomingburg, New York, and Toms River, Jackson Town-
ship, and Lakewood, New Jersey."
B. The Hasidim of Borough Park
Orthodox Jews began moving to Borough Park during the Great Depres-
sion and were followed by Yiddish-speaking European Hasidim in the post-
WWII period. In-movers also arrived from Williamsburg and Crown Heights, a
Hasidic "white flight" as the black and Hispanic populations in those neighbor-
hoods increased in the 1950s and 1960s.69 As Borough Park grew steadily more
Hasidic, non-Hasidic Orthodox Jews migrated to the adjacent Midwood and
Flatbush neighborhoods, where they maintain a strong presence today.7 o Bor-
ough Park, or "Boro Park," as it is known to locals, serves as the headquarters
for a number of Hasidic sects-Bobov, Belzer, Ger, Munkatcz, among others-
which are named after their villages of origin. It might be more accurate to call
Borough Park a series of overlapping Hasidic enclaves, or, as one scholar calls it,
a "Jewish melting pot."
Borough Park is the largest Hasidic enclave outside of Israel. It numbers
131,000 and has an average.household size of 4.2 people, among the largest in
the city. The enclave's population grew 71% from 2002 to 2011 and the Bor-
ough Park community district has become progressively more Jewish-78% in
2011, up from 51% Jewish in 2002.2 (The Williamsburg community district, by
contrast, which contains a sizeable Latino population as well as hordes of young
and hip "artisten," as the Satmar call them, is only 36% Jewish.) 73 Borough Park
had more births than any other community district in New York City, and
Maimonides, its hospital, had more births than any other hospital in New York
State-8000, or about 22 births per day.
a-village-with-the-numbers-not-the-image-of-the-poorest-place.html [http://
perma.cc/U7AA-AZ84] (noting that some observers question whether income
figures for these Hasidic communities are accurate given the networks of Hasidic
charities and unusual degree of mutual financial support within the community).
68. See, e.g., Joseph Berger, Uneasy Welcome as Ultra-Orthodox Jews Extend Beyond
New York, N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 2, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/
nyregion/ultra-orthodox-jews-hasidim-new-jersey.html [http://perma.cc/HA88
-4W7E].
69. EGOM MAYER, FROM SUBURB TO SHTETL: THE JEWS OF BORO PARK 33 (1979).
70. Beck et al., supra note 61, at 104.
71. MAYER, supra note 69. Mayer estimates that Boro Park was home to some 20 Ha-
sidic dynasties at the time of his book's publication-1979. This number has likely
increased in the years since.
72. Beck et al., supra note 61, at 112.
73. Id. at 120.
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The Hasidic communities of Borough Park and Williamsburg are demo-
graphically similar. Forty-nine percent of Borough Park Jews are 18 years or
younger, and an additional 30% are under 40.74 Sixty-eight percent of house-
holds have incomes of under $50,000 and 44% have incomes below 150% of the
federal poverty guideline.75 Borough Park has more foreign-born Hasidim than
Williamsburg, from places like Russia, Ukraine, Romania, and Israel, but the
percentage of foreign-born in each enclave is well below the city average.76
C. The "Voice" Strategy
Both Borough Park and Satmar Williamsburg are among the most densely
populated areas in the outer boroughs. Borough Park has the highest percent-
age of rent burdened tenants-that is, tenants spending more than thirty per-
cent of their income on housing costs-in the entire city.7 7 (It is likely that
Satmar Williamsburg has a similarly high rent burden, but the city does not
keep statistics at that level of resolution.) As successive generations in these en-
claves have four, five, or more children, they are desperate for more housing.78
Due to religious constraints, housing must be in or near the enclave. Hasidim
typically need to be within walking distance of their synagogue in order to avoid
driving or paying for transportation on the Sabbath. It is also exceedingly diffi-
cult to be a frum, or observant, Hasid apart from the highly specialized goods,
services, and institutions-like mikvehs, or ritual baths-available in the com-
munity.79 In addition to these religious needs, there are further constraints that
keep Hasidim in the enclave: many Hasidim are Yiddish-speakers, and their
culture emphasizes the importance of a full life of living in community. Grow-
ing families cannot simply up and move to the suburbs.so
Faced with these requirements, the Hasidic enclaves in Williamsburg and
Borough Park have separately, and largely successfully, used their political and
electoral might to lobby their elected representatives and city officials for vari-
ances, rezonings, land transfers, and particular development projects that have
enabled them to densify and expand the bounds of their enclaves. I call this the
"Voice" strategy, and it is largely conducted through the formal and public
74. Id. at 112.
75. Id. at 113.
76. Austensen et al., supra note 65, at 54, 65.
77. Id. at 65.
78. Smith, supra note 47.
79. As enclaves like Williamsburg and Borough Park have built out their religious in-
frastructure, it has become less demanding, in many ways, to be a fully frum Ha-
sidic Jew, perhaps contributing in a feedback loop to the "Haredization" of Or-
thodox Jewry in the last 50 years described generally by HEILMAN, supra note 62.
8o. See generally HEILMAN, supra note 62.
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channels by which zoning, land use, and development decisions are made in
New York City.
The "Voice" strategy is effective in Hasidic enclaves for several reasons.
First, the Hasidim's sheer numbers-large and growing-constitutes the basic
ingredient of political power. Second, the high rates of voting within the en-
claves strengthen their political influence. Unlike the other groups examined in
this Article, a substantial majority of Hasidic adults in Williamsburg and Bor-
ough Park are native-born and eligible to vote, and the various rebbes, as the
head rabbis of Hasidic sects are known, encourage voter turnout as a way to
amplify the political power of their sects."' Third, the guidance of the grand
rebbes can result in strategic bloc-voting patterns, which further amplifies the
enclaves' voting clout. "No one can deliver votes like a rebbe can" has been a
pearl of Brooklyn political wisdom for decades." It is not uncommon for low-
turnout primaries for Congress or general elections for City Council or State
Senate to turn on the Hasidic vote.3 The enclaves, consequently, have famously
responsive representatives such as Councilman Stephen Levin in Williamsburg
and State Assemblyman Dov Hikind in Borough Park.1
81. See also Sarah Wheaton, The Biggest Rival for a Congresswoman from Brooklyn Isn't
Even on the Ballot, N.Y. TIMEs (June 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/06/2 1/nyregion/congresswoman-nydia-m-velazquezs-biggest-foe-isnt-on
-the-ballot.html [http://perma.cc/NHE2-VNDH] (discussing influence of Satmar
Hasidic vote in bid for New York's Seventh Congressional District).
82. Joseph Berger, Out of Enclaves, a Pressure To Accommodate Traditions, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/nyregion/hasidic-jews-tum
-up-pressure-on-city-to-accommodate-their-traditions.html [http://perma.cc/
NMN2-GKL3]; see also RUBIN, supra note 59, at 208 ("Where else could one count
today in this kind of voting block? All a candidate needs to do is make a credible
commitment to support within reason a given group's interests, and the leader
will issue an order to his followers to vote for that person, an order that will in
most cases be observed 100%."). The rebbes' influence may have weakened since
the 2006 death of Moshe Teitelbaum, former Grand Rebbe of the Satmar Hasi-
dim. A succession battle between two of his sons has fractured the vote among
Hasidic Jews in New York City. See Joseph Berger, Divisions in Satmar Sect Com-
plicate Politics of Brooklyn Hasidim, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2012), http://www
.nytimes.com/2012/07/06/nyregion/satmar-rift-complicates-politics-of-brooklyn
-hasidim.html [http://perma.cc/6DE4-JW95].
83. Wheaton, supra note 81.
84. Berger, supra note 82. A note on Aldermanic privilege: In land use decisionmak-
ing, City Councilmembers typically defer to the member in whose district a pro-
ject is proposed. (They expect the same deference in return.) The responsiveness
of the Satmar representative thereby translates into the responsiveness of the en-
tire City Council when it comes to land-use policy within the enclave. Anecdotal-
ly, greater dominance within their Council district typically enables the Orthodox
Jews of Borough Park to elect one of their own; owing to greater heterogeneity,
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Fourth, the Hasidic community members have reached near total territori-
al dominance within the enclaves. This makes a strategy of variances and
upzonings both more possible and more desirable. A major obstacle to devel-
opment in New York City is sub-local political opposition, also known as
"NIMBYism" or "Not in My Backyard," driven by people who fear how changes
to the neighborhood may affect them or their property values. While these en-
claves have faced stiff opposition from non-Hasidim as they expand into other
neighborhoods, a phenomenon addressed below, within the enclave there his-
torically has been little in the way of external opposition to new development
plans. Territorial dominance also helps to ensure that the benefits of any new
development will redound to the community, minimizing the potential for in-
ternal opposition. When new housing is built in the enclave, there is little to no
chance that it will bring in some "undesirable element" or otherwise be occu-
pied by people from outside the community. Expansion of the enclave, both
demographically and geographically, makes the community more powerful."
Fifth, almost all development in the community is undertaken by a signifi-
cant Hasidic developer and owner class, which means that new development is
both for and by the Hasidim. 6 This control is important; outsiders who at-
tempt to develop within the enclave usually face opposition and Hasidim who
sell to outsiders risk ostracism.7 Sixth, coordinating institutions in the com-
munity, particularly the United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburg, have
But the enclaves also feature factional disputes, such as the succession
battle between the followers of sons of Satmar Grand Rebbe Moshe Teitelbaum,
who died in 2006, or the ongoing enmity between Assemblyman Hikind and Bor-
ough Park Councilman David Greenfield, currently chairperson of the Land Use
Committee. These factions reflexively oppose each other and may have the ten-
dency to diminish the political power of the Hasidic enclaves. See Ross Barkan,
The Tower Broker: Council's New Land Use Chair Set To Become Force in
City Politics, POLITICKER (Jan. 29, 2014, 1:33 PM), http://politicker.com/
2014/01/the-tower-broker-city-councdils-new-land-use-chair-set-to-become-force
-in-city-politics/ [http://perma.cc/49TF-3AAR]; see also Berger, supra note 82.
85. Here is the essence of the "group-regarding" land use decisionmaking that should
be examined more fully in a separate paper.
86. See Mark Maurer, Learning and Earning: Hasidic Brooklyn's Real Estate Machers,
REAL DEAL (Aug. 22, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://therealdeal.com/2016/08/22/learning
-and-earning-hasidic-brooklyns-real-estate-machers/ [http://perma.cc/C7FV
-L4V3].
87. The Hasidim in Williamsburg are particularly vigilant about protecting the hous-
ing market from outsiders-members who sell or rent to non-Satmar have been
shunned from the community. HEILMAN, supra note 62, at 257. According to Eric
Kober, Former Director of Housing, Economic, and Infrastructure Planning at
the New York City Department of City Planning, Hasidic developers use lucrative
development outside the enclave to subsidize below-market housing for fellow
Hasidim within the enclave-a private version of affordable housing. Interview
with Eric Kober, Former Dir. of Hous., Econ. & Infrastructure Planning, N.Y.C.
Dep't City Planning, in N.Y.C. (Sept. 17, 2015).
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cultivated and effectively wielded the political power of the community to push
a strategy of expansion and densification. Strong leadership and coordinating
institutions also support issue alignment among those in the community in
support of new development. Unlike the Chinese and Bangladeshi communities
discussed below, Hasidic population growth comes largely through natural in-
crease rather than new immigration, which may help the community avoid
some of the divides between long-time residents and new immigrants and
among immigrants from different regions.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, for most of these enclaves' exist-
ence, their locations have provided room to densify and expand. Post-World
War II, Williamsburg and Borough Park were differently situated from China-
town, which was dense and surrounded by valuable, already-developed real es-
tate." They were instead surrounded by lower-density housing and industrial
zones whose use receded in intensity as manufacturing jobs left the city. From
the 1950s to the 1980s, Brooklyn's and Williamsburg's populations shrank as
the Satmar's expanded. These communities have successfully opted to grow in
place in large part because there has been room to grow. As vacant land be-
comes scarcer and real estate becomes more expensive around Borough Park
and especially Williamsburg, the Hasidic enclave may increasingly shift to an
"Exit" strategy as we've seen in Chinatown over the last few decades.89
D. From Variances to Rezonings
Williamsburg and Borough Park have followed a similar pattern. Both
communities sought variances as their populations bumped up against the lim-
its of their current development capacity. In Borough Park, this process began
in the late 1970s and '80s; Williamsburg followed a decade or so later.9 o As their
populations expanded beyond what variances could accommodate, both com-
munities sought larger-scale rezonings that would enable them to develop more
housing as-of-right. Borough Park secured a major upzoning in 1992 and an-
other in 2005.91 Satmar Williamsburg obtained rezonings in 2001 and 2008 that
enabled it to expand.92 These rezonings are examined more closely below.
88. See infra Part IV.
89. Worth more attention is the Satmar community's attempt to "exit" Williamsburg
for rural New Jersey in the early 1960s, a plan that was blocked by an exclusionary
local planning board after it got wind that a community of Jews wanted to move
nearby. See Milton Honig, Jews Ask Jersey Court's Aid in Fight on Tract, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 25, 1963), http://www.nytimes.com/1963/09/25/archives/jews-ask-jersey-
courts-aid-in-fight-on-tract-brooklyn-sect-seeks.html [http://perma.cc/UW5D-
PHEY]. For a discussion of the "Exit" strategy, see infra Part IV.
90. Alan S. Oser, Housing Surge Alters Borough Park, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 1982),
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/05/2 1/nyregion/housing-surge-alters-borough
-park.html [http://perma.cc/FW3R-NRR2].
91. Lisa L. Colangelo, Mike Woos Borough Park with New Housing, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(Apr. 15, 2005), http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/boroughs/mike-woos-
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1. Borough Park
In 1982, the New York Times called Borough Park, a far-flung neighbor-
hood in an outer borough, "one of the most ambitious centers of real estate ac-
tivity in the city." 93 Hasidim were buying the neighborhood's wood frame hous-
es, tearing them down, and obtaining variances to build large, brick, two- and
three-family houses with huge interiors and special features for Orthodox fami-
lies-including, for example, two sinks, two refrigerators, and big kitchens to
aid in kosher food preparation, and balconies for Sukkot, a Jewish holiday when
many families dine outside.9 4 This process continued variance by variance
through the early 1980s, as the community's growing numbers and political in-
fluence grew.
In 1983, a coalition of groups representing Hasidic Borough Park success-
fully pushed for special modifications to the neighborhood's lower and medium
density zoning regulations.95 The special regulations increased the allowable
floor area of one-, two-, and three-family homes from 1.65 times the lot size to
1.8 times the lot size,' 6 increased maximum lot coverage, relaxed parking re-
boro-park-new-housing-article-1.566303 [http://perma.cc/H5HA-96W5]; Debo-
rah Sontag, Orthodox Neighborhood Reshapes Itself, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 1998),
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/01/07/nyregion/orthodox-neighborhood
-reshapes-itself.html [http://perma.cc/353G-AF4A].
92. City Planning Comm'n, In the Matter of an Application Submitted by Thomas
Klein LLC Pursuant to Sections 197c and 201 of the New York City Charter for an
Amendment of the Zoning Map, Section No. 13b (C 060377 ZMK), N.Y.C. DEP'T
Crl= PLAN. (Feb. 13, 2008), http://wwwl.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/
pdf/about/cpc/060377.pdf [http://perma.cc/8ETU-7BY2]; Smith, supra note 47.
93. Oser, supra note 90.
94. The housing boom in Borough Park followed a decade of tremendous expansion
of Hasidic religious institutions. The number of yeshivas and shuls multiplied
over the course of the 1970s as more Hasidim moved to Borough Park. MAYER,
supra note 69, at 7.
95. City Planning Comm'n, Amendment of the Zoning Resolution Pursuant to Section
200 of the New York City Charter creating a new Section 23-145 (Optional Provi-
sions for Certain R5 and R6 Districts in Brooklyn) for 1-Family, 2-Family, and 3-
Family Residences (N 820451 ZRK), N.Y.C. DEP'T CITY PLAN. (June 6, 1983),
http://wwwl.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/about/cpc/820451.pdf
[http://perma.cc/J2EM-PE3F]. One of the main groups pushing for special modi-
fications was the Council on Jewish Organizations, which closed in the late 1990s
in the aftermath of a bribery scandal involving the deputy director and Assem-
blyman Dov Hikind. Lawrence Cohler-Esses, COJO Official Gets Two Years,
JEWISH WK. (June 11, 1999, 12:00 AM), http://www.thejewishweek.com/features/
cojo-official-gets_2_years [http://perma.cc/GUW7-YK8X].
96. Since 1961, New York City has regulated the bulk of buildings using "floor area
ratio" or FAR, which relates the allowable floor area of a building to the size of the
lot it sits on. FAR equals the square footage of the building divided by the square
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quirements, and relaxed other bulk regulations to enable remarkably stout and
bulky three-story houses.97 In approving the text amendment, the City Planning
Commission laid out its planning rationale:
The need for additional housing in the past ten years has resulted
in the demolition of detached frame homes and their replacement with
two and three family semi-attached and attached homes. Since the late
1960's Boro Park has continued to attract large families, thereby in-
creasing the need for large residential units.
During the past three years, many owners/developers filed applica-
tions with the Board of Standards and Appeals for variances in order to
permit construction of large 3-story 3-family houses in excess of the
bulk allowed by the present R5 and R6 regulations.
The Boro Park neighborhood contains an unique concentration of
housing types occupied by large family sizes. The housing needs of
these families are very different from the rest of the City. In most cases
these families require exterior balconies and extra floor area to create
additional bedrooms for the children.
The City Planning Commission report notes that there were no speakers in
opposition-an indication of broad-based support for the upzoning that is dif-
ficult to imagine in almost any other neighborhood in New York City.99
In 1991, the Boro Park Builder's Association pushed to extend the new
rules to corner lots, which were not included in the 1983 text amendment.'o A
1992 rezoning further reclassified a swath of formerly industrial land, enabling
the construction of subsidized housing and nursing homes."o' In 1993, an
amendment relaxed balcony regulations to allow a wider range of outdoor
spaces necessary for the festival of Sukkot.o2 And amendments in 1998 and
footage of the lot. See N.Y.C. DEP'T OF CITY PLANNING, ZONING HANDBOOK 148
(2011).
97. See City Planning Comm'n, Zoning Resolution, N.Y.C. DEP'T CITY PLAN. § 23-
16(d) (Mar. 22, 2016), http://wwwl.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/
pdf/zoning/zoning-text/allarticles.pdf [http://perma.cc/BSH5-YCAQ].
98. Amendment of the Zoning Resolution, supra note 95, at 2.
99. Id.
1oo. City Planning Comm'n, In the Matter of an Application Submitted by the Borough
Park Builders Association, Pursuant to Section 201 of the New York City Charter, for
Amendments of the Zoning Resolution of the City of New York, Relating to Section
23-146 (N 890781 ZRK), N.Y.C. DEP'T CITY PLAN. (May 15, 1991), http://wwwl
.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/about/cpc/890781.pdf [http://perma.cc/
89WX-WH98].
101. Jim Dwyer, Sinking Like a Ton ofBricks, NEWSDAY (May 29, 1992).
102. City Planning Comm'n, In the Matter of an Application Submitted by the Depart-
ment of City Planning, Pursuant to Section 200 of the New York City Charter, for
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2000 established a special permit to enable larger houses and to allow houses in
Borough Park to project ten feet into the required rear yard.o3
These provisions helped to spark a new rash of teardowns and a boom in
building activity. Houses expanded in all directions, horrifying some design
professionals but making room for growing families.1 0 4 In the decades since,
houses enabled by these provisions have come to define the unique built char-
acter of Borough Park. The city issued more building permits in Borough Park
in the 1990s than in any other residential neighborhood in the city.0 5
In 2005, in the midst of a spate of community-initiated downzonings in
neighborhoods across outer Brooklyn and Queens, Mayor Bloomberg an-
nounced another upzoning in Borough Park along a former railroad right-of-
way. "This is a community where the population is growing more than three
times faster than the supply of housing," Bloomberg said at a Borough Park cer-
emony.10' The upzoned areas were to be developed with 80 units of infill hous-
ing.0 7
While there is nothing unusual about neighborhoods demanding, and in
many cases receiving, special treatment in the zoning resolution, two factors
make Hasidic influence on the zoning resolution unique. First, unlike almost
every other neighborhood mobilized around land use, such as Greenwich Vil-
lage, Borough Park asked for more, not less, development. Second, these neigh-
borhood actions embed a distinct ethnic and enclavist influence into the zoning
resolution that enables building typologies particular to the group."'o Hasidim,
Amendment of the Zoning Resolution of the City of New York Relating to Sections
12-10, 23-131, 23-132, 23-133, 23-146, 24-175 and 24-176 (N 930073 ZRY),
N.Y.C. DEP'T CITY PLAN. (Aug. 4, 1993), http://wwwl.nyc.gov/assets/
planning/download/pdf/about/cpc/930073.pdf [http://perma.cc/WB9W-WF6N].
103. City Planning Comm'n, In the Matter of an Application Submitted by the South
Brooklyn Community Organization Pursuant to Section 201 of the New York City
Charter, for an Amendment to the Zoning Resolution of the City of New York, Relat-
ing to Section 23-146 and Section 73-622 (N 000286 ZRK), N.Y.C. DEP'T CITY
PLAN. (Oct. 18, 2000), http://wwwl.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/
pdf/about/cpc/000286.pdf [http://perma.cc/5BHY-C4F5].
104. Oser, supra note 90.
105. Sontag, supra note 91.
1o6. Colangelo, supra note 91.
107. Id.
io8. While beyond the scope of this Article, this is also true of the special R4 regula-
tions incorporated into the Special Ocean Parkway District and the R2X zoning
classification in Homecrest implemented at the behest of Orthodox and Syrian
Jewish enclaves in southern Brooklyn. Like Borough Park's special regulations,
these provisions enabled construction of massive houses on comparatively small
lots. See City Planning Comm'n, Zoning Resolution, N.Y.C. DEP'T CITY PLAN. §
113 (Mar. 22, 2016), http://wwwl.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/
pdf/zoning/zoning-text/allarticles.pdf [http://perma.cc/BSH5-YCAQ].
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as the rare enclave population with voting power, can use politics to translate
preferences into law.
The legacy of the 1980s and 1990s is that Borough Park has some of the
newest housing stock in the city.'09 Zoning regulations enable the enclave to re-
place former industrial lots, bowling alleys, and any other structures with larger
housing and sites of Hasidic worship, education, and goods and services.no Un-
like in Williamsburg, conflict seems limited to displaced business owners, the
rare developer from outside the community who attempts to build in Borough
Park, or tension with merely Orthodox Jews in adjacent neighborhoods."' The
prospects for future densification and expansion are unclear. Borough Park
continues to expand southward below 60"' Street, but to the west it abuts Sunset
Park, another expanding enclave addressed in Part IV. If it can't expand indefi-
nitely, the neighborhood may have to endure another round of teardowns to
replace existing structures with larger multifamily buildings, as in Williams-
burg. As Councilman Greenfield says of Borough Park, "Every square inch is
being utilized here."" 2 The only place to go is up. Failing expansion and densifi-
cation, the enclave will be forced to shift to the type of "Exit" strategy employed
by Chinese immigrants when they established new enclaves in Sunset Park and
Flushing in response to crowding and skyrocketing rents in Manhattan China-
town.
2. Williamsburg
While the Williamsburg enclave is smaller and slower-growing than the
Borough Park enclave-74,500 versus 131,00-Satmar Williamsburg sits on
more intensely contested ground, particularly since the explosion of the Wil-
liamsburg real estate market over the past decade. Williamsburg has had the
most or nearly the most units permitted and certificates of occupancy issued of
any New York community district for over a decade.11 3 It is unclear what pro-
109. Sontag, supra note 91.
no. Liz Robbins, Bowlers in Brooklyn Enjoy a Haven While It's Still Around, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/23/nyregion/at-maple-lanes
-longtime-bowlers-prepare-for-loss.html [http://perma.cc/562H-N7DY].
Il. See, e.g., Jake Mooney, On an Unloved Lot, A New Source of Friction, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 25, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/25/nyregion/thecity/25fing
.html [http://perma.cc/VQ2R-TLLQI.
112. Gregory Beyer, Borough Park, Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/realestate/lOliving.html [http://perma.cc/
U2FE-ETJT].
113. Austensen et al., supra note 65, at 54. This is a big change. After the construction
of the Brooklyn-Queens Expressway, which split the neighborhood, Williamsburg
was abandoned by all but its poorest inhabitants. Of the Hasidic Jewish commu-
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portion of these new units are due to development along the 2005-upzoned
Waterfront,114 upland development in the "hip" parts of the neighborhood, and
the ongoing densification and expansion of the Satmar enclave.
The growth of Satmar Williamsburg has engendered conflicts with its
neighbors, especially the Puerto Rican and Dominican neighbors to the north,
since at least the 1970s. Hasidic community groups like UJO, led by the indefat-
igably pro-development Rabbi David Niederman, and Puerto Rican and Do-
minican community groups like Los Sures and El Puente, have fought pitched
battles over territory, development rights, and public housing placements for
decades' 1 5 In 1978, suits by Latino community organizations forced the New
York City Housing Authority into a consent decree that upped the number of
Hispanics in public housing developments in and around Satmar Williams-
burg."6
Throughout the 1990s, a much smaller but rapidly expanding population of
Satmars increased the housing supply through as-of-right infill development
and variances that increased the permissible bulk of housing or allowed for
housing development on land zoned for manufacturing. In one day in Novem-
ber 1997, for instance, the Board of Standards and Appeals approved variances
for four Satmar housing developments on industrial land."7 Shortly thereafter,
Satmar developers obtained further permission to convert the old Isratech fac-
114. See City Planning Comm'n, In the Matter of an Application Submitted by the De-
partment of City Planning pursuant to Section 201 of the New York City Charter, for
an Amendment of the Zoning Resolution of the City of New York, Relating to Article
II, Chapter 3 and Article VI, Chapter 2; Article XII, Chapter 3; and the elimination
of Article LX, Chapter 7 and Article X, Chapter 8 (N 050110(A) ZRK), N.Y.C. DEP'T
CITY PLAN. (Mar. 14, 2005), http://wwwl.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/
pdflabout/cpc/050110a.pdf [http://perma.cc/JY8A-FY2K].
115. NICOLE MARWELL, BARGAINING FOR BROOKLYN: COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS IN
THE ENTREPRENEURIAL CITY 33-94 (2007); Kareem Fahim, Old Feuds Resurface in a
Brooklyn Rezoning Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/08/05/nyregion/05broadway.html [http://perma.cc/PU5Z-356C].
u6. David Gonzalez, A Storm in Williamsburg as Two Ethnic Groups Clash, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 17, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/11/17/nyregion/a-storm-in
-williamsburg-as-two-ethnic-groups-clash.html [http://perma.cc/UE6L-4ECX].
In contrast to Borough Park, which has no public housing, Williamsburg has
thousands of units. State of New York City's Housing and Neighborhoods, N.Y.U.
FURMAN CTR. HOUSING & URB. POL'Y 74, 85 (2012), http://furmancenter.org/
files/sotc/SOC2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/4W3W-27R4]. The Satmar initially op-
posed public housing in Williamsburg, but were won over by promises of reserved
slots in the new buildings. When the buildings opened, the developments ranged
from 60 to 75% Hasidic. MARWELL, supra note 115.
117. Graham Rayman & Dan Morrison, Builders Probed / Poor Safety, but-Good Con-
nections, NEWSDAY (Jan. 15, 2000).
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tory into housing."' Projects like this are emblematic of the Satmar's 1990s ex-
pansion.
At the same time, both the community and the city understood that such
piecemeal efforts would not meet the community's need for housing for very
long. In 1995, at the annual Satmar banquet, attended by over 10,000 men,
Mayor Giuliani announced that the city was forming a Williamsburg Housing
Task Force to find solutions for the looming housing crunch. "We want you to
remain in Williamsburg. We want you to grow in Williamsburg," Giuliani
said.119 The task force's main objectives were to remedy the area's scarcity of res-
idential zoning and help to ease the housing-related tensions between the Ha-
sidic and Hispanic communities in the neighborhood.o
In 1997, the task force helped community groups negotiate Broadway as a
loose line of demarcation between the rapidly expanding Satmar enclave and
the informal territory of the shrinking Latino communities to the north. The
task force also paved the way for the rezoning of several industrial tracts adja-
cent to the Satmar enclave in the predominantly African-American neighbor-
hoods of Bedford-Stuyvesant and Clinton Hill.12 ' Both of these moves diverted
the Satmar expansion to industrial and residential areas to the south and east,
leading to conflicts over housing and land with African-Americans communi-
ties there.'
The 2001 rezoning comprised mostly industrial lots on the border between
South Williamsburg, predominantly Hasidic and Hispanic, and Bedford-
Stuyvesant and Clinton Hill. Satmar developers wasted no time raising six- and
seven-story buildings with three- to seven-bedroom apartments, kosher kitch-
ens, and balconies for Sukkot, a Jewish holiday when many families dine out-
side. 3 The characteristically Hasidic apartments effectively claimed new territo-,
ry for the Satmar. "Ten years ago there were no Jews living here," said Moishe, a
construction manager interviewed for an account of the Satmar expansion pub-
118. Bob Liff, Hasidim Plan for Housing Raises Sparks Among Blacks, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(Oct. 29, 1998).
119. Michael Cooper, Mayor Forms Panel to Seek New Housing, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
17, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/17/nyregion/neighborhood-report
-williamsburg-mayor-forms-panel-to-seek-new-housing.html [http://perma.cc/
X58Y-2HK9]. Like many New York City politicians, Giuliani understood that Ha-
sidic support could translate into many votes on Election Day.
120. Id.
121. Liff, supra note 118.
122. Id.
123. Andy Newman, In a Brooklyn Boom, A Patchwork of Housing Fills in the Bare
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lished in the Jewish Daily Forward. "Then they changed the zoning. Now it is
going heavy.""'
A similar dynamic appeared to be in play in 2006, when the city rezoned an
industrial area known as the Broadway Triangle for residential use at the behest
of the Satmar and gave UJO the right to develop affordable housing there."
The decision reignited conflict with Hispanic and black community groups, a
coalition of which, the Broadway Triangle Coalition, sued to block the plan on
fair housing grounds, claiming that the planned large apartments with kosher
kitchens and no elevators discriminated against blacks and Hispanics."' A judge
halted the affordable housing component of the development plans, which re-
main in limbo, though Hasidic-friendly market-rate housing proceeded with
construction.'17
Given the enclave's ever-expanding numbers and the responsiveness of
their elected officials, their opponents are increasingly resorting to the courts
rather than the political process to stem Satmar development. The Satmar, gen-
erally, support development, densification, and expansion because it benefits
their community and they possess, by all accounts, an unusually robust concep-
tion of community." Similar to residents of Borough Park, however, Samtar
tend to object to outside developers who seek to build structures for non-
Hasidim. Such was the case with the Gretsch building, a former musical in-
strument factory converted to luxury lofts by Orthodox, but non-Hasidic,
brothers. The Satmar staged a several-months' picket line outside the building
to protest the incursion of the "artisten" from north of Broadway into the Ha-
sidic enclave.' 9 They also shunned the Satmar owner who sold the building to
someone outside the community. 30 As housing costs soar in North Williams-
burg, the Satmar can expect more developments of this type. There is limited
industrial and cheap real estate to the south and east of the current enclave, and
many parts of the enclave are developed to maximum Hasidic density-that is,
the largest buildings that would not require an elevator ride on the Sabbath. It is
124. JTA, Ultra-Orthodox Jews Spread into Once-Black Brooklyn Neighborhoods,
FORWARD (Feb. 16, 2013), http://forward.com/news/171367/ultra-orthodox-jews
-spread-into-once-black-brookly/ [http://perma.cc/8WJG-C6HK].
125. Fahim, supra note 115.
126. Id.
127. Broadway Triangle Cmty. Coal. v. Bloomberg, 941 N.Y.S. 2d 831, 835 (2011); see
also Smith, supra note 47.
128. See generally RUBIN, supra note 59.
129. Tara Bahrampour, 'Plague ofArtists' a Battle Cry for Brooklyn Hasidim, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 17, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/17/nyregion/plague-of-artists-a
-battle-cry-for-brooklyn-hasidim.html [http://perma.cc/35XB-3J3R] (noting that
one sign translated from Yiddish stated, "Please remove from upon us this plague
of artists"); see also HEILMAN, supra note 62.
130. Bahrampour, supra note 129.
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likely that the Satmar will have to rely on other places, like Kiryas Joel, Monsey,
Lakewood, New Jersey, and a nascent enclave in Bayswater, Queens, if they seek
to expand.
IV. CHINESE ENCLAVES AND THE "ExIT STRATEGY"
Chinese immigrants use what I call an "Exit" strategy to make room for
their growing population in New York City. Manhattan Chinatown remains the
focal point of the community, but rising housing costs and overcrowding in the
speculative real estate markets of 1980s Manhattan led to the founding of satel-
lite Chinatowns in cheaper, less densely populated neighborhoods like Flushing,
Queens, and Sunset Park, Brooklyn. As the population of foreign-born Chinese
has increased, newer enclaves have emerged in Elmhurst, Queens, and Ben-
sonhurst, Brooklyn.13' There's even a nascent Chinese enclave in East Harlem.132
There were approximately 383,000 foreign-born Chinese in New York City
in 2015, an increase of 46% from 2000, as compared with New York City's ap-
proximately 6% population increase over the same period. Eighty-five percent
of foreign-born Chinese are from the mainland, with the balance from Hong
Kong and Taiwan. 33 Chinese may soon overtake Dominicans as the largest for-
eign-born population in New York City. While there were 436,000 Dominican
residents in 2015, the growth rate since 2000 was only 18%-less than half the
rate of increase for the Chinese population.134 Foreign-born Chinese have larger
than average household size, 3.2 versus 2.4 for native-born residents, and much
higher than average rates of overcrowding. While 16.1% of foreign-born Chi-
nese households are overcrowded, only 5.3% of native-born households are
overcrowded. 35
A. Manhattan Chinatown
Manhattan Chinatown emerged in the 1860s as a predominantly single
male community of Chinese migrants from the Gold Rush in California. The
census of 1860 counts 120 Chinese in an area bounded by Mott, Park, and
131. Newest New Yorkers, supra note 16, at 69.
132. J. David Goodman, Chinese Moving to East Harlem in a Quiet Shift from Down-
town, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/25/
nyregion/chinese-moving-to-east-harlem-some-from-chinatown.html [http://
perma.cc/8WV6-6X9W].
133. Newest New Yorkers, supra note 16, at 69. Updated by Population Division, New
York City Department of City Planning through September 29, 2017, U.S. Census
Bureau, 2015 American Community Survey, Public Use Microdata Sample.
134. Id. at 2.
135. Id. at 99. Updated by Population Division, New York City Department of City
Planning through September 29, 2017, using U.S. Census Bureau, 2015 American
Community Survey, Public Use Microdata Sample.
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Doyer streets in lower Manhattan. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 accelerat-
ed migration from the West Coast, increasing the population by a few thousand
men, mostly from the Pearl River Delta region of Southern China.136 When the
Exclusion Act was lifted in 1943, there were several thousand Chinese in China-
town, with roughly six times as many men as women.137 Chinatown was a place
where poor Chinese immigrants who did not speak English could stay in infor-
mal, overcrowded immigrant dormitories and find jobs in restaurants, printing
presses, and garment factories.138
Chinatown began expanding to its present-day size following the passage in
1965 of the Immigration and Nationalities Act. Between 1965 and 1990, the
Chinese population of New York City tripled.139 European immigration de-
creased, Asian immigration increased, and Chinatown devoured Little Italy over
the next couple decades. (Only a street of restaurants catering to tourists re-
mains of Little Italy; Chinatown surrounds it on all sides.)14o But the expansion
of Chinatown ran into the booming Manhattan real estate market of the 1980s,
as well as the resurgence of downtown as a desirable place to live after the crip-
pling fiscal crises and spiking crime rates of the 1970s. Chinatown was not
1980s Williamsburg, surrounded by dilapidated, low-density housing stock and
shuttered factories. Rather, Chinatown grew in the midst of some of the most
valuable real estate on the planet, and those prices bled into an enclave that had
traditionally served some of the city's poorest new arrivals.
Over the past few decades, Chinatown has experienced among the highest
price appreciation in the City, which has had baleful consequences for both
housing affordability and the once-robust garment industry.1 41 Overcrowding is
endemic, with stories of 20 people in a 200 square foot room, sleeping in shifts,
or basements illegally sub-divided to house dozens of families.1 42 Chinatown
136. MIN ZHOU, CHINATOWN: THE SOCIOECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF AN URBAN ENCLAVE
22 (1992).
137. Min Zhou & John R. Logan, Returns on Human Capital in Ethnic Enclaves: New
York City's Chinatown, 54 AMER. Soc. REv. 809, 816 (1989).
138. PETER KWONG, THE NEW CHINATOWN 49-56 (1996).
139. Id. at 23-24.
140. Notably, what's left of Little Italy is largely the result of a Special District in the
Zoning Resolution created in 1977 at the behest of incumbent property owners in
order to keep Chinatown at bay. City Planning Comm'n, Amendment of the Zon-
ing Resolution Pursuant to Section 20 of the New York City Charter Relating to Arti-
cle X, Chapter 8 Concerning the Establishment of the Special Little Italy District (N
760061 ZRM), N.Y.C. DEP'T CITY PLAN. (Jan. 3, 1977), http://wwwl.nyc
.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/about/cpc/76006 1.pdf[http://perma.cc/6PVW
-QCYC].
141. Austensen et al., supra note 65, at 76.
142. KWONG, supra note 138, at 180. This paper discusses unauthorized housing ac-
commodations primarily through the lens of Bangladeshi and ethnically South
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currently has the biggest difference in new rents for in-movers, which at an av-
erage of $1713 are the ninth highest in the city, and rents for existing residents,
which at $895 is among the cheapest in the city.' 43 Some residents refer to the
market trajectory over the last few decades as "frying the real estate in a wok."'44
This marked price differential has created conditions ripe for exit.
B. The "Exit" Strategy
In the 1980s, rising rents and the ongoing influx of new residents made
Chinatown increasingly less hospitable to current residents and new arrivals.
There was simply no room. In a 1986 article in the New York Times, a China-
town real estate and apartment broker said, "I have a list of scores of potential
clients who are looking for rentals and condominiums but I simply can't help
them. The reality is that there are no apartments and there haven't been any
available in Chinatown for years."' 5 Rent control and rent stabilization, which
includes anti-displacement measures like mandatory lease renewals under most
conditions, have helped Chinatown retain a stronger presence in Lower Man-
hattan than might otherwise be the case. But Chinatown's anti-displacement
provisions have also made it very difficult to redevelop its tenements and mid-
rise housing at higher densities to add units in the neighborhood for the grow-
ing Chinese community.146 Commercial rents had also tripled in eight years, af-
fecting the viability of the garment factories, printing presses, and other indus-
tries that drove employment in Chinatown. 47
Many Chinatown residents and Chinese immigrants began to seek out
more hospitable parts of the city. "A lot of Chinese are moving to the outer
boroughs because there is not enough room here, and the housing that might
be available has become enormously expensive," explained Margaret Chin in
1986.'4' Then president of Asian-Americans for Equality, a community organi-
zation in Chinatown, Chin became Chinatown's first Asian-American coun-
Asian communities in Queens, but the practice is also rampant in Chinatown, al-
beit in a different form owing to different housing typologies.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Richard D. Lyons, Satellite Chinatowns Burgeon Throughout New York,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 1986), http://www.nytimes.com/1986/09/14/realestate/
satellite-chinatowns-burgeon-throughout-new-york.html [http://perma.cc/NZH7
-KTAH].
146. Interview with Frank Ruchala, City Planner, N.Y.C. Dep't City Planning, in
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cilperson in 2009, a surprisingly late date that speaks to the enclave's somewhat
limited political heft. 14 9
In the 1980s, poorer Chinese began to move down the N, R, and D subway
lines to Sunset Park, Brooklyn, a neighborhood that had begun to spiral down-
ward after the decline of waterfront employment and abandonment by Scandi-
navian immigrants and Italians the generation before."'o The housing was
cheap, much of the commercial property was abandoned, and Manhattan Chi-
natown was less than a half-hour's subway ride away for those who commuted
to work, shop, or visit friends and family there. Relatively wealthier Chinese mi-
grated out to Flushing, Queens, at the very last stop of 7 Train, dubbed the "In-
ternational Express" or "Orient Express" in light of the many immigrant com-
munities in Queens that it serves.151 The migration patterns also had an ethnic
and linguistic component, with newer, poorer, and largely undocumented im-
migrants from Fujian province ("Downtown Chinese") heading to Sunset Park,
and Mandarin-speakers from the mainland and Taiwanese ("Uptown Chinese")
heading to Flushing."' While it had and continues to have many sub-enclaves,
Manhattan Chinatown remained in the 1980s and 1990s a primarily Cantonese-
speaking enclave dominated by southern Chinese."'
The pace of Chinese immigration has not slowed at all, and Chinese immi-
grants continue to found satellite enclaves in an ever-growing number of loca-
tions around the city. "The patterns for non-English-speaking Chinese are very
systematic and follow a specific logic," said Peter Kwong, a professor of Asian-
American studies at Hunter College, in a New York Times article from 2013.
"Are there trains? Are there others up there who speak Chinese? And cost." 54
Why did the Chinese employ an "Exit" strategy and disperse to other,
cheaper neighborhood to found satellite Chinatowns? Why not exercise their
"Voice," like the Hasidim, in an attempt to densify and expand their existing
enclave to accommodate current residents and newcomers? Several factors ex-
plain Chinese immigrants' approach.
First, Chinatown's location makes expansion difficult. At the time of Chi-
natown's founding, in the 1860s, the Lower East Side of Manhattan was a
hodge-podge of poor immigrants from around the world. Much of upper Man-
hattan and the outer boroughs, which were not yet part of New York City, was
149. See Margaret S. Chin, N.Y.C. COUNCIL, http://council.nyc.gov/dl/html/members/
home.shtml [http://perma.cc/6VZQ-ZC3Y].
150. Malcolm Gladwell, Rebirth in New York; Neighborhoods Growing Again in the City,
WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 1993).
151. Id.
152. For further discussion of the Downtown/Uptown distinction, see KWONG, supra
note 138, at 58-60.
153. Merle English, Brooklyn Enclave Is the New Chinatown: As It Grows, Neighborhood
Confronting Its Problems, NEWSDAY (Aug. 1, 1993).
154. Goodman, supra note 132.
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verdant farmland or outright wilderness. More than a century later, the enclave
that began in the 1860s is in the midst of immensely valuable real estate. Its use
as an enclave for poor immigrants is a holdover from a previous era rather than
something with a present-day economic logic, and Chinatown simply lacks the
economic power to expand greatly in that location. If, like the Bangladeshis, the
first wave of Chinese immigration had occurred in the 1980s, then the Chinese,
too, would have founded their first enclaves in far-off Queens or Brooklyn.
Immigrants go where they can afford to go and where there is space. As it hap-
pened, there is now simply very little room for expansion; the densification that
occurred in the 1980s typically accommodated very different populations: luxu-
ry buildings for rich, typically white, in-movers seeking to capitalize on China-
town's excellent location.' 5
Second, Chinatown lacked the political power of the Hasidic enclaves.
Most foreign-born Chinese are not citizens and do not have the ability to vote.
In the 1990s, when Chinatown was at or near peak population of around
100,000 Chinese, it had fewer than 10,000 voters."' While the city council
members for Hasidic Brooklyn are almost obsequious in their solicitude, 57
Chinatown has until recently had representatives like Kathryn Freed who are
openly hostile to the area's "dirty and smelly" streets and whose mission seemed
to be to contain Chinatown on behalf of her constituents in SoHo and
Tribeca.'m "In a way, I don't blame Council member Freed for some of her po-
sitions," said M.B. Lee, a Chinatown business leader in a New York Times article
from the mid-1990s. "She knows we don't have a lot of votes."' 9 Despite New
York City's large Chinese population and geographic concentration in China-
town and other enclaves, the first Chinese-American city council member
wasn't elected until 2001: John Liu, representing Flushing.'
Third, and related, is the fact that Chinatown in the 1980s and 1990s lacked
strong central leadership. Unlike, for example, the Satmar Hasidim of previous
decades, Chinese immigrants in Chinatown are not a monolithic body guided
by a grand rebbe. Rather, Chinatown is composed of immigrants from every
155. Bethany Y. Li, Chinatown Then and Now: Gentrification in Boston, New York, and
Philadelphia, ASIAN AM. LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND 6 (2013), http://aaldef.org/
Chinatown%20Then%20and%2Now/o2OAALDEF.pdf [http://perma.cc/WU35-
8CMM].
156. Andrew Jacobs, The War of Nerves Downtown, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 1996),
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/14/nyregion/the-war-of-nerves-downtown
.html [http://perma.cc/SZ2L-2CEF].
157. See supra Part III.
158. See Jacobs, supra note 156. It is important to note that City Council District that
includes Manhattan Chinatown also encompasses other neighborhoods, like
Tribeca, SoHo, and the Financial District, with very different demographics.
159. Id.
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part of Mainland China, Hong Kongese, Taiwanese, as well as ethnically Chi-
nese immigrants from a host of other countries around the. globe. Many speak
different languages or different dialects of languages and have different tradi-
tions that present coordination problems.'
This is in addition to the pitched ideological and interest-based battles be-
tween Chinatown community groups for political power that result in a low
level of issue alignment. Chinatown had been traditionally run, more or less, by
the Chinese Consolidated Benefit Association (CCBA), an assembly of about 60
family organizations founded in 1883. To this day, the CCBA represents old-
line Chinatown real estate and development interests. Through a complicated
and hard-to-unravel corporate structure, the group collectively maintains own-
ership over sixty multifamily, mixed-use, and commercial buildings in and
around the heart of old Chinatown.'
Although CCBA interests break in favor of upzonings that would increase
the value of their property and enable denser redevelopment, the dominance of
the CCBA was challenged beginning in the late 1960s by the influx of new and
different Chinese immigrant groups after the Immigration and Nationalities
Act of 1965 and by the rise of community-based organizations seeded with fed-
eral dollars during the Great Society era.'6 These groups' positions on land use
run the gamut. Some, like Chinese-American Planning Council (CPC), advo-
cate for upzonings in Chinatown and for relocation of parts of the Chinese
community to satellites in Sunset Park, Flushing, and other relatively cheap
neighborhoods in New York City. Asian-Americans for Equality (AAFE) has
supported similar strategies as a way to create needed housing for Chinatown's
cramped population, and has developed a significant amount of affordable and
senior housing that has enabled a lower-income population to remain in Chi-
natown even as housing costs rise.16 4
Other groups, like Asian-American Legal Defense and Education Fund
(AALDEF) and Chinese Staff and Workers Association (CSWA), use a conven-
tional left-wing frame into land use and development issues, opposing upzon-
ings and proposing downzonings as a tactic to prevent luxury development and
to attempt to preserve the neighborhood.' 5 These groups also maintain a strong
focus on shielding tenants from harassment and advocating for stronger rent
regulations, which protect tenants but prevent denser redevelopment that could
help Chinatown accommodate more people.
161. See Kwong, supra note 138, at 41.
162. Nick Tabor, How Has Chinatown Stayed Chinatown?, N.Y. MAG. (Sept. 24, 2015),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/09/how-has-chinatown-stayed
-chinatown.html [http://perma.cc/J3L5-Y9FR].
163. See Kwong, supra note 138, at 7.
164. Christine Haughney, High-Rises Are at Heart of Manhattan Zoning Battle, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 15, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/15/nyregion/15zoning
.html [http://perma.cc/9VY3-C6M5].
165. Mangin, supra note 1, at 108-109.
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Though Chinatown faces limits on its ability to expand, it deserves credit
for continuing to exist as an enclave for a significant low-income population
despite its central location. All of the above groups have contributed to this dis-
tinctive feature of Chinatown: the CCBA and other Chinese real estate interests
that have maintained ownership and control of property and have refused to
sell; groups like AAFE that have developed affordable and senior housing; and
groups like CSWA and AALDEF that militantly protect the rights of existing
tenants under existing rent regulation laws.
C. Sunset Park, Brooklyn
Rumor has it that the origins of the Sunset Park enclave can be traced to the
opening of a single Chinese grocery store on Eighth Avenue in the mid- 1980s.'66
David Chen, the former executive director of the Chinese-American Planning
Council, says that the garment industry, fleeing high commercial rents in Chi-
natown, was the first to move to Sunset Park. Restaurants and grocery stores
emerged to feed the garment industry workers, which in turn led to residential
in-movers in a self-reinforcing cycle."' Sunset Park was cheap and relatively
safe. It was convenient to Manhattan Chinatown on multiple subway lines, local
and express. And it had a large stock of under-utilized commercial and residen-
tial properties.
The Chinese population grew quickly, as did the Hispanic populations in
the western half of Sunset Park, stabilizing the neighborhood after a long period
of decline. In late-1960s New York, neighborhood after neighborhood was
abandoned or subject to dramatic racial transition as whites fled for Staten Is-
land, the farthest reaches of Queens and Brooklyn, or the suburbs. "White
flight" also occurred in Sunset Park as Scandinavian and Italian immigrants left
in greater numbers than those who moved in. Sunset Park's population de-
clined from a peak of over 100,000 in the post-WWII period to 86,000 in the
1970s.'68 A survey in that period counted 200 abandoned one-, two-, and three-
family homes and 40 abandoned apartment buildings." Vacant storefronts
lined Eighth Avenue, the main commercial corridor for eastern Sunset Park,
well into 1980s. During this period, however, the Chinese population in Sunset
Park grew incredibly fast. While Sunset Park was only mentioned in passing in a
1986 article about New York's Chinese enclaves, within a decade it had an esti-
166. Albor Ruiz, A Fresh Look at Chinese Immigration, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 9,
1999), http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/boroughs/fresh-chinese-immig
-story-article-1.844536 [http://perma.cc/HWS3-YZ3B]; see also generally TARRY
HUM, MAKING A GLOBAL IMMIGRANT NEIGHBORHOOD: BROOKLYN'S SUNSET PARK
(2014).
167. Interview 'with David Chen, Former Exec. Dir., Chinese-American Planning
Council (Aug. 6, 2014).
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mated population of 70,000 Chinese and was neck-and-neck with Flushing as
New York's second largest Chinatown. 7 o
The documented foreign-born Chinese population has increased from
20,000 in 2000 to about 34,000 today, a 71% increase. 7' Today, however, Sunset
Park is threatened by some of the same problems that squeezed Manhattan
Chinatown in the 1980s. Sunset Park has had the third fastest housing-price ap-
preciation since 2000, an increase in sales prices of 163% for two- to four-family
buildings.7 2 It has a crowding rate of 30.1%, and its severe crowding rate is the
second highest in the city, after Jackson Heights, Queens, one of the most im-
migrant-dense part of New York City.'" Unlike Manhattan Chinatown, Sunset
Park has opportunity to grow and has taken advantage of it. Rising prices and
increasing crowding have led Chinese to expand farther and farther into adja-
cent neighborhoods like Dyker Heights, Borough Park, Bath Beach, and espe-
cially Bensonhurst, which now has more documented foreign-born Chinese
than any other neighborhood in New York City. 7 4 As the commercial infra-
structure matures, Bensonhurst is poised to become the next center in New
York City's polycentric Chinatown network.
D. Flushing, Queens
The beginnings of the Flushing enclave date to the 1970s. The "Uptown
Chinese," relatively wealthy Taiwanese immigrants, wanted a place apart from
the predominantly low-income and less educated Chinese immigrant commu-
nity in Lower Manhattan and established an outpost in predominantly white
outer Queens.'75 In the 1980s, Flushing also became the destination of choice for
relatively well-off Mandarin-speaking newcomers over Cantonese-speaking
Chinatown. While Flushing is well-served by the 7 train, it takes a subway trans-
fer to get to Chinatown, thus attenuating Flushing's connection to Chinatown,
at least compared to the easier access between Chinatown and Sunset Park.
Flushing's relative wealth and distance give it something of the feel of a suburb
relative to Chinatown's city. Unlike Sunset Park, Flushing is also home to a
number of other Asian immigrant groups, including one of New York's largest
170. English, supra note 153.
171. Newest New Yorkers, supra note 16, at 68. Updated by Population Division, New
York City Department of City Planning through September 29, 2017, U.S. Census
Bureau, 2015 American Community Survey, Public Use Microdata Sample.
172. Austensen et al., supra note 65, at 80.
173. Here, "crowding rate" refers to more than one person per room; "severe crowding
rate" is when there are more than 1.5 persons per room. Id. at 80, 114. Note:
These rates also include Mexican and Dominican households in western Sunset
Park, and these groups also have high rates of crowding. Id.
174. Newest New Yorkers, supra note 16, at 69.
175. See KwONG, supra note 138, at 54, 60-62.
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agglomerations of Koreans (although many Koreans have moved to the actual
suburbs)."'
Flushing has a much lower poverty rate and crowding rate than Sunset
Park.1' However, housing prices are rising at comparable rates: sales prices have
appreciated about eighty percent since 2000, and Flushing ranks high in hous-
ing appreciation in community districts with predominantly single-family
housing.78 Median rents are in the top third of all community districts, despite
its distance from the city's core.'79 New condos in the area are flirting with the
$1,000 per square foot threshold, a rarity for a neighborhood so far from the
real estate ferment of Manhattan.' Median rent burden is the fourth highest in
the city, a reminder that Flushing has the fourth-highest proportion of foreign-
born in the city."'
The Flushing enclave historically has more political clout than the enclaves
in Manhattan or Sunset Park because Chinese accounted for a larger percentage
of their Council District. In 2001 Flushing became the first district to elect an
Asian-America council member: John Liu, who went on to hold citywide office
as comptroller during the Bloomberg administration. Liu was replaced by Peter
Koo, one of only five Republicans in the 51-member City Council until he
switched to the Democratic Party amidst Republican in-fighting in 2012.82
The Flushing enclave continues to grow rapidly. The most recent census
listed 37,200 foreign-born Chinese residents in Flushing, more than double the
17,300 there in 2000. This population is both expanding in place and helping to
facilitate an additional "Exit" enclave of 17,500 in Elmhurst, Queens.'83
E. Land Use
The "Exit" strategy is premised on voting with one's feet rather than exert-
ing power through the political process. As such, the rezonings in and around
Chinese enclaves in recent decades have reflected the preferences of the com-
munity to a lesser extent than, say, those in "Voice" communities described
above.
176. Newest New Yorkers, supra note 16, at 214-15, 218-19.
177. Austensen, et al., supra note 65, at 60, 76, 94.
178. Id. at 94.
179. Id.
18o. C.J. Hughes, A Robust Reception After a Rocky Start, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/realestate/more-condos-in-flushing-queens
-at-sky-view-parc.html [http://perma.ccD6CH-6XD6].
181. Austensen et al., supra note 65, at 94.
182. Colin Campbell, Democrats Huzzah Koo Party Change, OBSERVER (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://observer.com/2012/01/democrats-huzzah-koo-party-switch-2/ [http://
perma.cc/CQK3-DVW4].
183. Newest New Yorkers, supra note 16, at 216.
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As with many other rezonings during the administration of Mayor Bloom-
berg, a City-initiated 2008 rezoning of parts of the East Village and Lower East
Side was intended to balance preservation of the classic tenement-style built
form in some areas with increased housing production and redevelopment in
others. The rezoning included upzonings of areas between Delancey and Hou-
ston streets on the Lower East Side but also protective downzonings and con-
textual rezonings' 84 of residential areas on the Lower East Side or in the East
.Village.'"' The rezoning did not include Chinatown proper, but did cover an in-
creasingly Chinese eight-block area between Grand and Delancey east of
Chrystie Street.'"'
Some Chinatown-based affordable housing organizations, like AALDEF
and Chinese Staff and Workers' Association, opposed the rezoning on the
grounds that the upzoning would encourage more intense luxury development
on Chinatown's doorstep, thus increasing the pressures that have squeezed
Chinatown since the 1980s."7 They also argued that the downzonings in areas
just outside Chinatown would increase development pressure on adjacent, un-
protected areas in Chinatown, leading to a 'wall' of unwanted luxury residen-
tial buildings."'" Other groups, like Asian Americans for Equality, saw the re-
zoning as an opportunity to create both more affordable housing and market
rate housing, potentially relieving some of the pressure in the area.
184. "Upzonings" increase development capacity in a neighborhood; "downzonings"
decrease development capacity in a neighborhood; "contextual rezonings" use
bulk regulations to limit new construction to forms that fit with a neighborhood's
existing built character. In practice, it can often make it more difficult to build or
more difficult to fit the maximum allowable square footage on a given lot, limit-
ing development.
185. City Planning Comm'n, In the Matter of an Application Submitted by the Depart-
ment of City Planning Pursuant to Sections 197-c and 201 of the New York City
Charter and Proposed for Modification Pursuant to Section 2-06(c) (1) of the Uni-
form Land Use Review Procedure, for an Amendment of the Zoning Map, Section
No. 12c (C 080397(A) ZMM), N.Y.C. DEP'T CITY PLAN. (Oct. 7, 2008),
http://wwwl.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/about/cpc/080397a.pdf
[http://perma.cc/KZA3-6WW5].
186. Haughney, supra note 164.
187. See, e.g., Proposal for a Chinatown/Lower East Side Special Zoning District,
COALITION TO PROTECT CHINATOWN & LOWER EAST SIDE (Oct. 25, 2010),
http://www.hunter.cuny.edu/ccpd/repository/files/rezoning-proposal- 10_25
_10final-draft.pdf [http://perma.cc/9473-7HZB ] ("In 2008, the Department of
City Planning rezoned ... part of the East Village/Lower East Side ... . This re-
zoning unfairly burdened the Houston and Delancey Street corridors with denser
zoning than the wealthier areas of the East Village to the north. Consequently the
area south of Houston Street where low-income communities of color live and
work has become targeted for luxury development.").
188. City Planning Comm'n, supra note 185, at 28.
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Regardless, the impetus for the rezonings did not come from within China-
town and there was no "Chinatown consensus" on its desirability or effects. Nor
is it obvious with nine years' hindsight how the rezoning may be impacting the
evolution of Chinatown or its satellites relative to the development that would
have happened in the absence of the rezoning. The area was experiencing signif-
icant demand before the rezoning, owing to its central location and other fac-
tors, and would have seen significant development regardless. The rezoning
merely added capacity in some places, reduced it in others, and altered building
form.'89
Rezoning activity in the outer boroughs, particularly Flushing, has consist-
ed primarily of defensive contextual rezonings meant to prevent new develop-
ment and preserve neighborhood character. These types of rezoning were very
common in Queens during the Bloomberg administration, and they will be ad-
dressed in more depth in the next section on South Asian enclaves in Queens.190
The booming market in the 2000s led to teardowns and development in rela-
tively low-density parts of the outer boroughs, leading to calls for a spate of re-
zonings limiting development.' 9 ' East Flushing was downzoned in 2005 and
North Flushing was downzoned in 2009.19'
189. Id.
190. See infra Section V.C.
191. For instance, the East Flushing Rezoning was initiated at the behest of the East
Flushing Civic Association in response to "out-of-character development." City
Planning Comm'n, In the Matter of an application Submitted by the Department of
City Planning Pursuant to Sections 197-c and 201 of the New York City Charter for
an Amendment of the Zoning Map, Section Nos. 10c and 10d (C 050277 ZMQ),
N.Y.C. DEP'T CITY PLAN. 4 (July 11, 2005), http://wwwl.nyc.gov/
assets/planning/download/pdf/about/cpc/050277.pdf [http://perma.cc/3R3C
-WGQF). The North Flushing rezoning was initiated at the behest of the North
Flushing Civic Association, the Broadway-Flushing Homeowners Association,
and the Auburndale Homeowners Association in order to "curb[] overdevelop-
ment." City Planning Comm'n, In the Matter of an application Submitted by the
Department of City Planning Pursuant to Sections 197-c and 201 of the New York
City Charter for an Amendment of the Zoning Map, Section Nos. 7d, 10a and 10c (C
090281 ZMQ), N.Y.C. DEP'T CITY PLAN. 21 (Apr. 1, 2009), http://wwwl.nyc
.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/about/cpc/090281.pdf [http://perma.cc/U9N9
-6FNB].
192. See East Flushing Rezoning-Approved, N.Y.C. DEP'T CITY PLAN. (July 27, 2005),
http://wwwl.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/plans/east-flushing/east
flushing.pdf [http://perma.cc/TSJ2-LMZT]; North Flushing Rezoning-Approved,
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In Sunset Park, the contextual rezoning approved in 2009 occurred in re-
sponse to the as-of-right development of large apartment buildings.' 3 The re-
zoning generally allowed for larger development along the avenues but newly
limited the bulk of development in strictly residential areas along the streets. 94
It also included incentive-based inclusionary zoning that would enable develop-
ers to build larger buildings in exchange for setting aside a portion of their
buildings as affordable housing. Developer take-up of the inclusionary incen-
tives has not been as enthusiastic as it was on the Williamsburg waterfront, but
that may change with the recent extension to Sunset Park of property tax breaks
for buildings that include affordable housing, a strong financial incentive to
participate in the inclusionary housing program.'95
V. BANGLADESHI ENCLAVES AND THE UNDERGROUND" STRATEGY
The Bangladeshi and other ethnically South Asian enclaves in various
neighborhoods in Queens use what this Article calls an "Underground" strategy
to make room for their growing populations. These enclaves lack the numbers,
the territorial dominance, and the political power of the Hasidic and Chinese
enclaves. Bangladeshis are relatively late arriving to a city experiencing an inten-
sifying housing crunch. During the time Chinese immigrants were forming sat-
ellite enclaves in outer Brooklyn and Queens, the Bangladeshis were just begin-
ning to immigrate to the United States.'9' The Bangladeshis, too, ended up
primarily in the farther reaches of Brooklyn and especially Queens. Even as
their numbers doubled and doubled and doubled again, there was no question
of expanding or densifying their relatively small enclaves through some exercise
of economic or political muscle, as in the Hasidic enclaves. Instead, Bangladesh-
is and other ethnically South Asian groups in Queens have relied largely on un-
authorized conversions, basement apartments, and accessory dwellings to ab-
sorb rapidly growing populations. In many neighborhoods, these conversions
193. See Tarry Hum, Planning in Neighborhoods with Multiple Publics: Opportunities
and Challenges for Community-Based Nonprofit Organizations, 29 J. PLAN. EDUC. &
RES. 461, 471-72 (2010).
194. City Planning Comm'n, In the Matter of an application Submitted by the Depart-
ment of City Planning Pursuant to Sections 197-c and 201 of the New York City
Charter for an Amendment of the Zoning Map, Section Nos. 16b, 16d, 22a & 22c (C
090387 ZMK), N.Y.C. DEP'T CITY PLAN. (Aug. 5, 2009), http://wwwl.nyc.gov/
assets/planning/download/pdflabout/cpc/090387.pdf [http://perma.cc/M7ZC-
CU7Z].
195. See Charles V. Bagli, Affordable Housing Program Gives City Tax Break to Develop-
ers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/
nyregion/affordable-housing-city-tax-break-developers.html [http://perma.cc/
E5MP-NKS4].
196. Newest New Yorkers, supra note 16, at 6-3 ("The diversity visa program enabled
immigrants from Bangladesh to establish a beachhead in New York in the
1980s.").
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have become the new norm and have resulted in what amounts to guerilla re-
zoning. Incumbent residents have fought back with land use law, filing many
thousands of complaints and working with city officials and their elected repre-
sentatives to instigate a wave of defensive downzonings and contextual rezon-
ings across Queens.
A. Bangladeshi Immigration
Bangladeshis did not start arriving in New York City in substantial num-
bers until the late 1980s. Between 1990 and 2000, the population nearly quintu-
pled, increasing by 393%.197 This increase was due both to increasing diversity
and family reunification visas for Bangladeshis and to high birthrates. Although
Bangladeshis exhibit high male-to-female ratios common to recently arriving
immigrant groups, they have high marriage rates and a large percentage of men
and women in childbearing age. Bangladeshi immigrants are also a young
population, with a median age of 35, well below those of most other immigrant
groups and the native-born population.' 8 In the last three censuses, 1990, 2000,
and 2010, Bangladeshis have leapt from the 42 nd Most populous immigrant
group, to the 17d' most populous, to the 10t'. Because of their high rates of
growth-90% since 2000, making them the fastest-growing immigration group
in New York City-Bangladeshis have overtaken the shrinking Russian popula-
tion and the moderately growing Indian population for a spot on the top ten
list. There are currently about 74,000 Bangladeshis in New York City to Rus-
sians' and Indians' approximately 75,000.'99 Bangladeshis have among the high-
est average household size in New York-4.2, exceeded only by Mexicans' 4.6-
and also the highest rates of crowding-nearly 40% of households are over-
crowded."oo
The most common neighborhoods for Bangladeshis are Jackson Heights,
Elmhurst, Briarwood-Jamaica Hills, and Richmond Hill in Queens; there is also
a community in Kensington, Brooklyn, and a growing presence in City Line,
197. Nina Bernstein, Record Immigration Is Changing the Face of New York's Neighbor-
hoods, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/24/
nyregion/record-immigration-is-changing-the-face-of-new-yorks-neighborhoods
.html [http://perma.cc/PM83-U9KZ].
198. Newest New Yorkers, supra note 16, at 96. Updated by Population Division, New
York City Department of City Planning through September 29, 2017, using U.S.
Census Bureau, 2015 American Community Survey, Public Use Microdata Sam-
ple.
199. Id. at 113. Updated by Population Division, New York City Department of City
Planning through September 29, 2017, using U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 and 2015
American Community Survey Public Use Microdata Sample, and U.S. Census Bu-
reau, 1990 and 2000 Censuses.
200. Id. at 99. Updated by Population Division, New York City Department of City
Planning through September 29, 2017, U.S. Census Bureau, 2015 American
Community Survey, Public Use Microdata Sample.
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Brooklyn, just across the border from Ozone Park, Queens.2 o' Small enclaves
tend to grow when Bangladeshi mosques are established. "When I came here in
1990, there were very few Bangladeshi families here," said Dilafroz Ahmed, a
Bangladeshi women who lives with her family in Jamaica Hills. "I wanted a
convenient neighborhood with good schools. Now many people are moving
here because of the mosque."202
There is significant spatial overlap in Queens with other ethnically South
Asian populations, including Indians and Indo-Caribbeans from countries like
Guyana, Trinidad, and Tobago, where ethnic South Asians are the plurality.
Guyanese, for instance, are the fifth most populous immigrant group in New
York City with about 136,400 people. While ethnically African Guyanese tend
to settle in Afro-Caribbean sections of Brooklyn, ethnically South Asian Guya-
nese cluster heavily in Richmond Hill and South Ozone Park; 33,400 live in an
enclave in those adjacent neighborhoods.2 03 Much of this Part's discussion of
unauthorized conversions and defensive rezonings applies to these other ethni-
cally South Asian populations, as well as Queens's sizeable Latino populations,
who employ similar strategies to make room for newcomers and expanding
families. Unauthorized conversions are a widespread strategy among poor and
overcrowded immigrant populations; this Article does not mean to imply that
only Bangladeshis use it.
B. The "Underground" Strategy
In Bangladeshi communities and elsewhere, widespread conversions of
one- and two-family homes into two- and three-family homes have altered
whole neighborhoods, resulting in guerrilla rezonings in areas where housing
was not otherwise available. Between 1990 and 2000, New York City gained
about 114,000 dwellings that are reflected in census numbers but not in the of-
ficial number of certificates of occupancy the city granted for new construction
201. Id. at 219. Updated by Population Division, New York City Department of City
Planning through September 29, 2017, using U.S. Census Bureau, 2011-2015
American Community Survey, Summary File. In an amazing story that deserves
much more attention in a future Article, the Bangladeshis of Astoria-8000 of
them-migrated almost wholesale to Detroit in the late 1990s and early 2000s. See
Sarah Kershaw, Queens to Detroit-A Bangladeshi Passage, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 8, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/08/nyregion/queens-to-detroit
-a-bangladeshi-passage.html [http://perma.cc/E787-XLCK].
202. Diana Dhaman, If You're Thinking of Living In/Jamaica Hills; Tranquil Haven for
Many Ethnic Groups, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/
06/08/realestate/if-you-re-thinking-living-jamaica-hills-tranquil-haven-for-many
-ethnic-groups.html [http://perma.cc/LC49-BQZL]; Guimaraes, supra note 53.
203. Newest New Yorkers, supra note 16, at 212. Updated by Population Division, New
York City Department of City Planning through September 29, 2017, using U.S.
Census Bureau, 2011-2015 American Community Survey, Summary and Public
Use Microdata Files.
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and renovation.2 0 4 Many of these dwellings are basement apartments, attic
apartments, garage apartments, unlicensed single-room occupancy conversions,
and the like. In the 2000 census, thirteen community districts in Queens suspi-
ciously showed increases in the number of units in structures built before 1990.
In some neighborhoods, there were more of these "new" old units than newly
constructed units ." According to estimates by the Pratt Center for Community
Development, the Citizens Housing and Planning Council, and Chhaya Com-
munity Development Corporation, unauthorized dwellings accounted for half
of the housing stock added in New York City in the 1990s. In total, these dwell-
ings represent four percent of housing in the City, with 300,000 to 400,000 oc-
cupants.20
The highest rates of unauthorized conversions are in Queens, which experi-
enced a surge of conversions in the 1990s. Since that time, an estimated three
quarters of Queens housing growth is illegal. According to a survey by Pratt
Center and Chhaya, the top neighborhoods for unauthorized dwellings are all
in Queens: Jamaica, Richmond Hill, and South Ozone Park, among others;
Jackson Heights, Elmhurst, South Ozone Park, and Richmond Hill received the
most complaints of unauthorized dwellings from neighbors." These are all
neighborhoods with high concentrations of ethnically South Asian populations
such as Bangladeshis, Indo-Guyanese, and Indians.
Independent surveys indicate that as many as thirty to fourty percent of
homes in some of these neighborhoods have unauthorized basement apart-
ments-one- and two-family homes have become what locals call "illegal
threes." The unauthorized units are typically a third cheaper than a comparable
market-rate unit, and they are an important source of income for the owners,
who usually live in the "authorized" portion of the structure.208 Many of the
owners are immigrants who wouldn't be able to afford the house without the
rental income. During the run-up to the subprime mortgage crisis, it was easier
for a large, multigenerational Bangladeshi family to buy a house in outer
Queens with a no documentation, or "no-doc," loan than it was for that family
204. Robert Neuwirth, New York's Housing Underground: A Refuge and a Resource,




206. Illegal Dwelling Units: A Potential Source of Affordable Housing in New York City,




207. Neuwirth, supra note 204, 6.
208. CHHAYA, supra note 206.
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to find an appropriately large apartment on the rental market.2 0 9 This dynamic
also helped to push the Bangladeshi community away from denser neighbor-
hoods where rentals predominate to areas with one- and two-family homes.
Surveys indicate that income from unauthorized accessory dwellings is capital-
ized into the sale price of homes in these neighborhoods, even if the conver-
sions haven't happened yet.2 "o
Many of the units raise health and safety concerns. For example, the units
are not in fire-proof buildings and many lack multiple means of egress. Some
opponents of the illegal dwellings question whether housing advocates and city
agencies look the other way: a crackdown on unauthorized dwellings could dis-
place hundreds of thousands of predominantly low-income immigrants in a
city with high housing costs and low vacancy rates. It would also lead to an in-
crease in foreclosures among immigrant homeowners who depend on rental
income. The inaccessibility of market-rate rental housing causes many of these
people to resort to unauthorized housing in the first place. It would likely be a
mess.
Why have Bangladeshis and other ethnically South Asian populations in
Queens relied on the "Underground" strategy? First, a major enabling factor is
the nature of the housing stock in the borough where they live. About 36% of
the land area in Queens in zoned for one- and two-family houses, and only 11%
is zoned for multifamily units." Neighborhoods in Queens were among the
first in New York City to be designed for the automobile. Many have garages
and separate entrances in the rear that make unauthorized conversion simpler.
The low density and comparative spaciousness of dwellings in Queens makes
them ripe for conversion in a way that is difficult to imagine in multifamily
structures, where residents frequently add walls to create additional bedrooms
but cannot easily create entirely new units with separate kitchens and bath-
rooms.
Second, and relatedly, the Bangladeshis within these enclaves typically own
their homes rather than renting. (One could also view this as an attribute of the
housing stock in question.) They may not exert control over whole areas of the
city as the territorially dominant Hasidic enclaves do, but ownership gives them
greater control over their dwellings than a typical renter would have. Various
types of regulations, including land use regulations, control what happens with-
in buildings, but these are typically much more difficult to enforce than regula-
tions dealing with aspects of development, such as overall bulk, on full public
display.
209. Interview with Seema Agnani, Former Exec. Dir., Chhaya Cmty. Dev. Corp. (Feb.
21, 2014).
210. Martha Galvez & Frank Braconi, New York's Underground Housing, 9 URBAN
PROSPECT 1, 1-4 (June/July 2003), http://chpcny.org/wp-content/uploads/
2011/02/UPUndergroundHousingl.pdf [http://perma.cc/A3NW-8TWV].
211. CHHAYA, supra note 206, at 5.
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Third, with the possible exception of Indo-Guyanese in small parts of
Richmond Hill and South Ozone Park, no ethnically South Asian populations
exert territorial dominance over swaths of land in the way that Hasidic or Chi-
nese enclaves do. Their numbers are smaller, and the populations are more dis-
persed owing to their relatively late arrival to a growing city. In the context of a
districted land use process, this factor tends to diminish the political power of
the Bangladeshis, the Indians, and the Indo-Guyanese in a way that limits their
ability to use a "Voice" strategy to accommodate their growing populations.
Fourth, the fact that Bangladeshi immigrant populations are relatively poor
and relatively recent arrivals further limits the locations where they can live and
the strategies they can employ to make room. Unlike the Chinese or much of
the Hasidic population, Bangladeshis tend to reside in farther out neighbor-
hoods in the outer boroughs. While Bangladeshis can and do make use of
something like an "Exit" strategy in order to establish footholds in new neigh-
borhoods, these new neighborhoods are lateral moves from farther out neigh-
borhoods in outer boroughs to other similarly situated neighborhoods, like City
Line, Brooklyn. They are not retreats from dense, high-cost neighborhoods to
less expensive neighborhoods with much more space, as was the case with Chi-
nese migration in the 1980s.
Fifth, compounding the obstacles to residential mobility above, many
Bangladeshis and other ethnically South Asian people do not have citizenship
and cannot vote; they have relatively weak representation in the City Council
and other layers of government. Like many immigrant groups, these popula-
tions rely on community-based organizations like Chhaya and the Bangladeshi-
American Community Development and Youth Services Corporation to press
their interests where elected representatives will not. Chhaya in particular has
worked hard to build the South Asian Task Force (SATF), a coalition of diverse
groups serving South Asians in Queens; DRUM (Desis Rising Up and Moving);
Adhikaar, a Nepali women's organization; the Indo-Caribbean Alliance; and
South Asian Youth Action (SAYA), among others. This coalition of communi-
ty-based organizations works to amplify the political power of the South Asian
immigrant community both inside and outside the electoral process.m The or-
ganizations count the election of Daniel Dromm over Helen Sears, a coun-
cilmember who had been unresponsive to the South Asian community, as a vic-
tory that arose partially out of SATF's voter registration and get-out-the-vote
drives and its candidate forums held ih the district. Chhaya has also indicated
plans to engage with land use and development concerns; Chhaya recently hired
a planner and will advocate for increased density in the neighborhoods where
its constituency lives.213 Community-based organizations are careful to note,
however, that as in Chinatown, not all groups are in agreement about increased
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density, which may complicate efforts to create more housing for the burgeon-
ing South Asian population in Queens. 14
Nevertheless, Bangladeshis and other ethnically South Asian immigrants in
Queens are tied to their communities and need to be in the city in order to ac-
climate to a new country. Unable to employ an "Exit" or a "Voice" strategy to
make room for their burgeoning populations, these groups have done what they
must in the places they are. Necessity is the bottom line.
C. Neighborhood Backlash
Some Bangladeshi immigrants in Queens have faced neighborhood back-
lash. This backlash stemmed, in part, from the increase in unauthorized conver-
sions, which in turn limited the capacity of neighborhood city services to ad-
dress their burgeoning, but unrecorded, constituencies.
Neighborhoods in which thirty to fourty percent of houses have been ille-
gally subdivided will experience a dramatic increase in population. These
neighborhoods also tend to have unit-level crowding problems, exacerbating
the issue. Official statistics may not reflect this increase."' As a result, and in
part due to the tax revenue lost from "off-the-book" units, city services, from
garbage pickup to public schools, may not be able to accommodate these shad-
ow populations. In Queens in the mid-1990s, enrollment in public schools in
neighborhoods with widespread conversions began to exceed 100% capacity.
School officials brought in trailers to accommodate the overflow."'*
Beginning in the 1990s and into the 2000s, complaints about illegal conver-
sions began to skyrocket, although some of the increase may have stemmed
from the 2002 implementation of New York City's 311 System, a citywide hot-
line that made it much easier to report complaints. Many of the affected neigh-
borhoods were largely older, white, and populated with people who liked the
low-density suburban feel of their corner of Queens. 7 Unlike many in the
Bangladeshi community, incumbent owners can vote and do so in large num-
bers. Motivated by the perceived threats to their neighborhood and home val-
ues, the incumbent residents of these neighborhoods increasingly urged their
elected representatives and city officials to do something to "preserve the char-
acter of the neighborhood.""'
214. Id.
215. See Neuwirth, supra note 204, at 3.
216. Dick Sheridan, Trailer Classroom Vote Tonight, N.Y DAILY NEws (July 24, 1997),
http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/boroughs/trailer-classroom-vote-tonight
-article- 1.780678 [http://perma.cc/BU65-AQ6G].
217. See Neuwirth, supra note 204, at 4.
218. Jennifer Steinhauer, City Plans to Rezone Overdeveloped Neighborhoods in Queens,
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Elected officials responded, and thus incumbent residents pursued a suc-
cessful "Voice" strategy of their own. The result in the 2000s was a wave of de-
fensive downzonings or historic district designations in neighborhoods with
growing immigrant populations in Queens, precisely the areas that needed
more licit development to accommodate population growth. Defensive down-
zonings are typically initiated by communities that do not want development,
increases in population, or other changes that they believe threaten the charac-
ter of the neighborhood or their property values.
In 2004, for example, Mayor Bloomberg visited Queens to announce plans
to downzone or contextually rezone more than a dozen Queens neighbor-
hoods. 9 The neighborhoods on his list included Jamaica, Jamaica Hill, Rich-
mond Hill, Woodside, and Flushing, and were expanded in later years to in-
clude Ozone Park, Elmhurst, Astoria, and more sections of Richmond Hill,
Flushing, and Jamaica.2 0 "Overdevelopment changes the character, overdevel-
opment changes the traditional appearance of neighborhoods," Mayor Bloom-
berg said in a 2004 New York Times article.'" In a Newsday article on the same
event, Amanda Burden, then the director of the Department of City Planning,
said "make no mistake-this city needs housing, but we need to make sure that
this new housing does not undermine the qualities that make our neighbor-
hoods attractive and desirable."m' Over the next ten years, the balance of the
Bloomberg administration, the city conducted over forty rezonings in parts of
Queens, an overwhelming majority of which were defensive downzonings. Al-
most all had the same rationale: "The proposed rezoning aims to preserve the
established character of [neighborhood] and to ensure that future residential
development will reinforce the existing development patterns."23
These defensive downzonings do little to address unauthorized conver-
sions-they were illegal before the rezonings and they're illegal after-and they
complicate the efforts to create more housing for immigrant populations.
That's most likely the point. Defensive downzonings are by their nature exclu-
sionary-they aim to keep newcomers out in order to preserve the neighbor-
hood as it is.
There are some exceptions to the general pattern of defensive downzonings
in the face of guerrilla rezonings. Recently Rafael Espinal, a member of the New
York City Council who represents parts of City Line, Brownsville, and East New
York, has advocated for a study and possible pilot program to legalize illegal
219. Id.
220. Id.; see also Queens, N.Y.C. DEP'T CITY PLAN., http://wwwl.nyc.gov/site/planning/
plans/queens.page [http://perma.cc/SZ4K-CF6S] [hereinafter Queens Land Use]
(last visited Mar. 25, 2018)
221. Steinhauer, supra note 218.
222. Mike Saul, Beep Ready for a Rezone; Joins Mike in Preservation Push, DAILY NEWS
(June 16, 2004).
223. See, e.g., Queens Land Use, supra note 220.
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basement apartments in some of the immigrant-heavy areas of his district." 4
When immigrants come to dominate areas that formerly had large incumbent
populations, the politics of illegal conversions shifts.
The Bangladeshi and ethnically South Asian populations of Queens present
a notable contrast to other groups this Article addresses. In Hasidic enclaves,
the community lobbied for changes to land use law so that the community
could create more housing for their growing population. They faced opposition
from other communities in the area-for example, in Williamsburg, most no-
tably the Hispanic population to the north and the African-American commu-
nities to the southeast. Still, the enclaves were able to use their political heft to
get the laws passed and expand and densify their communities. The Bangladeshi
and ethnically South Asian populations in Queens are much more politically
vulnerable. Instead of using land use law to fulfill community objectives, they
face a backlash from incumbent residents who are using their political heft to
make their neighborhoods less hospitable to new immigrants. Whether this will
change settlement patterns in these communities is yet to be seen, though we
have already seen some migration by Bangladeshis from Queens to poorer,
more dangerous neighborhoods like City Line in Brooklyn, where a new
mosque is attracting residents."
VI. TOWARDS MORE HOUSING THROUGH FORMAL CHANNELS
This Article aimed to reveal the formal and informal ways in which immi-
grant groups facing different opportunities and constraints shape land use and
development policy and practice in a particular set of neighborhoods in New
York City. While the stories of these ethnic enclaves are interesting in them-
selves, a bottom-up perspective is also more broadly relevant to groups playing
the zoning game. The experiences of the Hasidic Jewish, Chinese, and South
Asian communities also complement and ground narratives of limited housing
production in New York City and other supply-constrained, high-housing-cost
cities across the country.
For housing policy practitioners and elected officials in today's supply-
constrained cities, the spectrum of formal and informal strategies outlined in
this Article suggest a perhaps obvious but nonetheless crucial lesson: growing
populations, and by extension, growing cities, will expand whether or not plan-
ning and land use regulation accommodate this change. Refusing to accommo-
date growth will not prevent a city's communities from expanding; rather, re-
strictive land use measures will instead result in rising housing costs, crowded
housing, overburdened infrastructure, increased homelessness, and other perils
224. Erin Durkin, City Council Advances East New York Affordable Housing Plan, N.Y.
DALY NEWS (Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/brooklyn/
city-council-advances-east-new-york-affordable-housing-plan-article- 1.2601295
[http://perma.cc/DXW8-BTBB].
225. See Guimaraes, supra note 53.
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of unplanned growth. This is a reality that should explicitly frame policy discus-
sions and political debates over growth.
Exclusionary zoning has been successful in individual suburbs because
fragmented municipal governance offers a range of substitutes for individual
suburbs." As the experience of the Chinese and Bangladeshi and, to an extent,
Hasidic enclaves demonstrate, large cities aren't substitutable in the same way,
especially for more place-dependent populations. In major population centers,
growth is driven by a range of regional economic factors, many of which are be-
yond the influence of local policymakers. 7 "If you don't build it, they won't
come" may be the wish of opponents to growth, but it flies in the face of the
more complicated reality described in this Article.
To be fair, many housing policy practitioners in local government under-
stand this, and there is growing consensus about the broad outlines of the ob-
stacles to accommodating growth-a tangled set of regulatory and political
problems that exist in reciprocal relationship to each other.' Devising policies
to address the problem is trickier. The "Voice," "Exit," and "Underground"
strategies discussed above point in directions that will be useful to policy mak-
ers and future researchers.
First, the problem of anti-development politics is the most daunting obsta-
cle to lower-cost housing that high-cost regions, such as Chinatown, face. Fig-
uring out how to assuage opposition, rather than attempting to overpower it, is
perhaps a promising way forward. As this Article has suggested, groups become
less opposed to development the more they see themselves as the beneficiaries
of it. For immigrant and ethnic populations, those benefits may simply be a
more robust community, with greater numbers, greater access to preferred
goods and services, and more political and economic power. For native-born
populations, benefits may take the shape of neighborhood bargains, such as bet-
ter transit, tax breaks, or some other inducement in exchange for increasing
housing capacity in the neighborhood." 9
As legal scholars such as David Schleicher and Rick Hills have suggested, re-
forms to land use procedure may offer a way out of the Olsonian conundrum
whereby concentrated neighborhood interests in preventing development
trump the more diffuse citywide interests in increased development, leading to
226. See S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456
A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983); S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel
(Mount Laurel l), 336 A.2d. 713 (N.J. 1975).
227. Local economic conditions are largely a function of global, national, and regional
economic conditions that local government can't do much about. See Richard
Schragger, Rethinking the Theory and Practice of Local Economic Development,
77 CHI. L. REv. 331, 338-39 (2010).
228. Zoning regulations are often restrictive because restrictive regulations are politi-
cally popular. Conversely, accommodating population growth by zoning for more
housing is generally politically unpopular. Mangin, supra note 1, at 113.
229. See, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 1, at 1725-32; Mangin, supra note 1, 117-19.
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the systematic undersupply of housing.230 When rezoning decisions occur at the
neighborhood level, neighborhoods tend to function like exclusionary suburbs,
blocking development and pushing it onto other neighborhoods (which in turn
also try to block development). Engaging in citywide actions to accommodate
more housing on the margin, as New York City recently did with its Zoning for
Quality and Affordability Initiative, involves all neighborhoods in the discus-
sion, facilitating a bargaining dynamic among a full range of interests rather
than predictable and outcome-determinative opposition by a single neighbor-
hood.231
Nevertheless, this Article challenges the notion that neighborhoods are al-
ways and everywhere reflexively opposed to new development in their neigh-
borhoods. As the experiences of Chinese, Hasidic, Chinese, and Bangladeshi en-
claves suggest, a surprising number of neighborhoods, including many ethnic
and immigrant groups, are a likely base of support for larger and more dense
buildings, new infill development, or upzonings to accommodate their expand-
ing populations. The issue is that pro-development groups in these neighbor-
hoods often lack the political and economic power to enact favorable changes
through formal channels, especially in light of more politically and economical-
ly advantaged groups that do not agree.
In New York City, for instance, historic preservation groups like Greenwich
Village Society for Historic Preservation and the Historic Districts Council are
well organized, well-funded, good at organizing and communicating, command
support in many of the city's tonier precincts, and mobilize voters in low-
turnout sub-local elections. In other words, they score high in the factors this
Article identifies with success in the zoning game. On a smaller scale, the same
is true of many homeowner and neighborhood associations that spearheaded
the wave of outer borough downzonings in the 2000s. Unless pro-development
groups can similarly strike fear into the hearts of elected officials, land use poli-
tics in most neighborhoods will remain stuck in a slow-growth equilibrium.
(Add to that status quo bias: it is almost always easier to stop something than to
make something happen.)
230. Hills & Schleicher, supra note 1, at 92.
231. For more information, see Zoning for Quality and Affordability, N.Y.C. DEP'T
CITY PLAN., http://wwwl.nyc.gov/site/planning/plans/zqa/zoning-for-quality-and
-affordability.page [http://perma.cc/T5JM-U9G5] (last visited Mar. 25, 2018). An
anecdote about the public review for Zoning for Quality and Affordability illus-
trates this dynamic: Public review for a citywide action proceeds from the neigh-
borhood level, to the borough level, and then to the citywide level at the City
Planning Commission and City Council. Neighborhoods overwhelmingly op-
posed the measure during neighborhood review; it wasn't until citywide review
that the affordable housing developers, housing policy experts, and others came
out to support the measure. If this had been a series of neighborhood actions, it's
unlikely that these supporters would have turned out at all-they are citywide
groups that don't have time to speak at dozens of individual hearings.
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To that end, this Article suggests that land use politics may change as for-
eign-born populations succeed native-born populations in many parts of the
city. Anecdotal evidence suggests that neighborhoods shift from an emphasis on
enforcement to an emphasis on legalization of illegal basement apartments as
neighborhoods tip to majority-immigrant and elect councilmembers more re-
sponsive to their interests. Compare, for instance, the campaign against illegal
apartments in Bensonhurst, a historically Italian-American neighborhood
where Chinese from neighboring Sunset Park are engaging in the "Under-
ground" conversion of one- and two-family homes, to the campaign for legali-
zation led by Councilmember Espinal in largely immigrant neighborhoods
elsewhere in Brooklyn. Will more neighborhoods be more open to development
as they become increasingly foreign-born? This Article suggests that, in at least
some cases, they will, and that, as a result, Councilmember Espinal's campaign
is more likely to succeed.
In a similar vein, allowing non-citizens to vote in municipal elections could
have far-reaching consequences for land use politics in New York and other cit-
ies with concentrations of non-citizens. The Chinese and Bangladeshi enclaves
described in this Article could take a significant step toward more formal strate-
gies if they had greater capacity to elect and influence city councilmembers.
Would the defensive downzonings described above have been as widespread if
immigrant residents of those neighborhoods had more say in their implementa-
tion? The New York City Council has flirted with this reform in the past but has
yet to cross the threshold.232
Second, this Article identifies the types of communities and organizations
that can push a progressive pro-development line and begin to re-align the poli-
tics that have suppressed development in high-cost regions over recent decades.
Immigrant- and ethnic-based Community Development Corporations (CDCs)
and other community-based organizations can make particularly good partners
for policymakers, city officials, and others seeking to expand housing produc-
tion in cities where that is difficult. Many of these groups are uniquely posi-
tioned to understand the housing needs of their communities, while also pos-
sessing the political credibility and clout to win support for expanding
development in the community.
Immigrant-led CDCs and CBOs may also play a role in converting progres-
sive housing advocacy organizations to the pro-housing side.2 33 The anti-
gentrification campaigns of these groups tend to focus on preventing market-
rate development in low-income neighborhoods. While this position seeks to
232. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
233. Immigrant-led CDCs and CBOs will likely have more credibility with traditional
housing advocacy organizations than the burgeoning YIMBY ("Yes In My Back-
yard") movement, which traditional housing advocacy organizations view with
considerable skepticism. See, e.g., Alana Samuels, From 'Not in My Backyard' to
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protect existing communities from increased housing costs, it also exacerbates
housing undersupply and puts upward pressure on prices for existing stock.3 4 If
these formidable groups advocated instead for citywide increases in housing
production, it could reorient housing politics toward explicitly pro-housing
policies that would reduce pressure on housing costs generally and low-income
neighborhoods in particular. Hasidic groups like the UJO have been successful
on this front; Chinese groups like AAFE and Chinese-American Planning
Council and South Asian groups like CHHAYA CDC have played an increas-
ingly pro-housing role in land use debates in recent years. Ideally, groups like
this would have a broader influence on the housing advocacy community, lead-
ing them to advocate not only for more affordable housing but also for more
housing generally. Both prongs are necessary to reduce pressure on the low-
income communities these groups support.
At the same time, this Article indicates that pro-development neighbor-
hoods will likely remain the exception for the foreseeable future. The Article
identifies only one group-the Hasidim-that has consistently succeeded in
densifying and expanding its enclaves through formal channels. This group
demonstrates extraordinary solidarity and territorial dominance, high citizen-
ship and voting rates, a relentless focus on housing, and developers who can en-
sure that the gains from new development benefit the community. If that's what
it takes to press a successful pro-development politics, immigrant groups will be
hard-put to replicate their achievements. It would probably be easier for more
established immigrant families to decamp to the suburbs.
This Article provides a perspective on group-regarding land use decisions
that contrast with the (generally accurate) atomistic, property-value-regarding
take on land use politics found elsewhere in land use scholarship. The "Voice,"
"Exit," and "Underground" strategies indicate that future land use scholarship
would benefit from increased focus on the role of ethnicity and groups in land
use development. But this Article's descriptive points also highlight key ques-
tions that housing policy practitioners, particularly pro-development advocates,
should address: How do these groups arise and come to share a perspective on
development in their communities? How do they coordinate? Or do these pro-
cesses arise organically? What strategies can they use to make room for them-
selves and put their imprint on our ever-changing cities?
Finally, this Article demonstrates that informality often flourishes where
formal channels fail. Policy makers, elected officials, planners, and residents
must understand that they can't regulate people out of existence. This basic fact
cannot be overemphasized. People need to live somewhere. Certain ethnic and
immigrant groups are particularly place-dependent. Regulatory frameworks
should strive to accommodate demographic realities. If supply-constrained cit-
ies refuse to upzone and otherwise adjust to greater density, they can expect
guerilla rezonings and the attendant difficulties that come with unplanned
growth.
234. Mangin, supra note 1, at 115.
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